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n his news conference of January 31, 1973, President Nixon raised
a number of academic and congressional eyebrows by asserting that
,the "constitutional right for the President of the United States to im-
pound funds[,] . . .not to spend money, when the spending of money
would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all the
people ... is absolutely clear."' Far from laying the issue to rest, this
sweeping declaration triggered a strong countermovement within
Congress.
The debate on impoundment, spirited and fervent though it may
be, has a tendency to generate more heat than light. A rich lode of
precedents is available to comfort either side. Despite the volume of
commentary on the subject, no one can say precisely what "impound-
ment" is.2 This has resulted in a confusion of terms and misleading
statistical claims. The first part of this article attempts to clear away
some of the conceptual underbrush by offering a typology of impound-
ment, suggesting which are controversial and which are not. Then,
three case studies are offered to demonstrate that apart from the
broad issue of constitutionality is the practical need for good-faith
efforts on the part of administrative officials. Without such efforts,
administrators cannot expect to receive from Congress the customary
broad grants of discretionary power. The system of delegation would
then, be profoundly altered, with many of the informal and nonstatu-
tory controls frozen into law.
* Analyst, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. B.S., College
of William and Mary, 1956; Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author, not the Congressional
Research Service.
1. 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 110 (1973).
2. For an exploration of the definitional problem, see Note, Presidential Impound-





Discussion of impoundment requires distinguishing among vari-
ous types of action. Some actions are legitimate exercises of executive
power, while others trespass directly on the legislative domain. To
say that "impoundment has been used in the past" is to say nothing
at all. The proper inquiry must be "What kind of impoundment?"
It comes in many shapes and colors, legitimate in one case and
highly suspect in another. As an omnibus term, "impoundment"
tells us very little. To state the definition in a manner analogous to
Mr. Justice Jackson's description of security, impoundment is like
liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name.3
The first of four categories, efficient management, covers in-
stances in which funds are withheld either (1) to effect savings, (2)
to accommodate changing events which make an expenditure un-
necessary, or (3) to satisfy basic managerial responsibilities. Impound-
ments of this type are of a commonsense variety, evoking few pro-
tests, if any, from members of Congress.
A second category includes impoundment actions based upon
statutory authority. Some statutes provide a routine delegation of
power, calling upon the expertise and managerial talents of the ex-
ecutive branch. Other statutes represent a surrender of power that
could have been exercised at the legislative level, had there been the
desire to do so. In both cases, impoundment authority is derived
from statute.
A third category concerns the general constitutional powers of
the President, particularly his duties as Commander in Chief. Im-
poundments in this area are highly controversial, placing the Presi-
dent's power directly in conflict with Congress's responsibility to pro-
vide for the common defense.
The last category covers executive policy making. In pursuing
such goals as curbing inflation or reordering budget priorities, the
President uses impoundment to further his objectives at the expense
of legislative preferences. In such cases it is not sufficient to agree with
3. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), Mr.
Justice Jackson said that "security is like liberty in that many are the crimes com-
mitted in its name." Id. at 551.
IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS
administrative goals, for that easily degenerates into a philosophy
wherein "the end justifies the means."
These four categories are not mutually exclusive. For example,
efficient management has been partially enacted into statute (the Anti-
deficiency Act) and may even be regarded as part of the President's
constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws. The value
of categorizing impoundments is to separate their various underlying
sources of authority.
I. EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
It has long been the practice of the executive branch to regard
appropriations as permissive rather than mandatory. Impoundment
has thus existed since the days of George Washington, at least to the
extent that expenditures occasionally fall short of appropriations.
A. To Effect Savings
Attorney General Judson Harmon declared in 1896 that an ap-
propriation is not mandatory "to the extent that you are bound to
expend the full amount if the work can be done for less . . . ."4 This
same point was made in 1942 by President Roosevelt. The setting
aside of budgetary reserves for the purpose of preventing deficiencies
or for effecting savings was defended as sound fiscal practice. Roose-
velt wrote that to mandate that all funds be fully expended "would
take from the Chief Executive every incentive for good management
and the practice of commonsense economy." 5
In 1950 the House Committee on Appropriations emphasized
that economy "neither begins nor ends in the Halls of Congress. ' 6
According to the Committee, an appropriation of a given amount
for a particular activity constituted
only a ceiling upon the amount which should be expended for that
activity. The administrative officials responsible for administration of
an activity for which appropriation is made bear the final burden for
4. 21 Op. A7-r'y GEN. 415 (1896); similar statements appear id. at 392, 422.
5. Hearings on First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1944
Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 739 (1943) (letter
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Senator Richard Russell, Aug. 18, 1942).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950).
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rendering all necessary service with the smallest amount possible
within the ceiling figure fixed by the Congress.
7
These are limited powers of impoundment. President Roosevelt
expressly recognized the constraints on this type of action by saying
that the use of budgetary reserves to prevent deficiencies or to effect
savings was not "a substitute for item or blanket veto power, and
should not be used to set aside or nullify the expressed will of Con-
gress . . . ." The 1950 statement by the House Committee on Ap-
propriations warned that "there is no warrant or justification for the
thwarting of a major policy of Congress by the impounding of
funds."9
B. Changing Events
If Congress provides funds for a purpose, and later events make
the expenditure unnecessary, administrators are expected to withhold
the funds and return them to the Treasury. Jefferson, for example,
found it unnecessary on a number of occasions to use all of the money
provided in a contingent fund. He regularly returned the unexpended
balances to the Treasury. 10
A more publicized impoundment by Jefferson concerned the
withholding of .50,000 in 1803. When Jefferson notified Congress
that the funds appropriated for gunboats would remain unexpended,
he explained: "The favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the
Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of that law unnecessary
. . ."1. Since the emergency contemplated by Congress failed to ma-
terialize, because of the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson saw no reason
to spend the money. Neither did Congress. A year later, having taken
the time to study the most recent models of gunboats, Jefferson in-
formed Congress that he was proceeding with the program.
12
7. Id.
8. See Hearings, supra note 5.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 1797, supra note 6, at 311.
10. 1 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 325 (J.
Richardson ed. 1925). See also id. at 354, 366, 382-83, 405, 421, 447.
11. Id. at 348.
12. Id. at 360. For a discussion of the historical background for this by Profes-
sor Joseph Cooper, see Hearings on Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the Presi-
dent Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm.
on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 676-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Ervin Hearings].
The Nixon administration attempted to use the routine impoundment by Jefferson
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C. Managerial Responsibilities
An administration may have a number of other valid reasons for
suspending a program or payment. In 1840, the Supreme Court up-
held a decision of the Secretary of the Navy to withhold payment from
a widow whose claim was based on a resolution passed by Congress.13
Had the Secretary mechanically followed the direction of Congress,
without exercising judgment or discretion, the widow would have re-
ceived two pensions: one from the specific resolution adopted on her
behalf, and a second from a general pension bill. The Secretary prop-
erly concluded that Congress could not have intended double benefits.
After World War II, President Truman temporarily withheld
funds from a program to build hospitals for veterans. The adminis-
tration had thought it better to wait until the returning servicemen
had settled in order to achieve the most effective placement of medi-
cal facilities.
14
In January 1971, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment interrupted a mortgage-subsidy program designed to help
poor families buy their own homes. HUD Secretary Romney sus-
pended part of the program when it became apparent that abuses by
real estate speculators were "more prevalent and widespread than had
previously been evident."'15 After the potential for abuse had been cor-
rected, the program was reinstated.
Several months later HUD suspended a low-income housing pro-
gram in New Jersey because of inadequate administration by the
Newark Housing Authority. The money was released when the Au-
thority complied with HUD's request for organizational changes.'
6
to justify much more serious actions. See Hearings on Department of Housing and
Urban Development; Space, Science, Veterans and Certain Other Independent Agen-
cies Appropriations for Fiscal 1973 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 565 (1972) (statement by George Romney, Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development); Hearings on Caspar W. Weinberger To Be Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (Part 1) Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).
13. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). For other early cases
distinguishing between ministerial and executive duties, see Fisher, Funds Impounded
by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 124, 126-28 (1969).
14. Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Sub-
comm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 85 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Ervin Hearings].
15. Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1971, at A2, col. 1. Section 235 of the Omnibus
Housing Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(c)(2) (1971), authorizes payment by the
government of up to all but one percentage point of the interest rate on a mortgage
loan for a low income buyer.
16. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1971, at 36, col. 2.
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A final example involved HEW's 1971 withholding of federal
funds from black nationalist Col. Hassan Jeru-Ahmcd's drug re-
habilitation program. Inadequate bookkeeping was cited as the
reason. A report by the General Accounting Office disclosed that at
least $171,533 in federal drug treatment funds were paid to a relative
and friends of Hassan, were spent for automobiles and real estate, or
were unable to be counted for.17
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The President is not only permitted limited powers of impound-
ment to be exercised at his discretion; in some cases he is required
or directed by law to withhold funds under conditions and circum-
stances prescribed by Congress.
A. Economy and Reorganization Acts
Economic collapse in 1929 led to broad presidential authority
for reducing expenditures. In 1932 President Hoover received au-
thority to make partial layoffs, reduce compensation for public offi-
cials, and consolidate executive agencies in order to effect savings.
Funds impounded by this Economy were to be returned to the
Treasury. 8 The House of Representatives disapproved the initiatives
offered by Hoover, preferring to leave reorganization changes to the
incoming President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 9 Before leaving office,
Hoover signed two more economy measures authorizing his successor
to effect further reorganization and to reduce military spending in
accordance with an economy survey to be ordered by the President. "
Once in office, Roosevelt requested authority to reduce veterans'
benefits and the salaries of federal employees.21 The Economy Act of
17. Washington Post, June 26, 1971, at BI, col. 6; id., May 31, 1972, at Al,
col. 3.
18. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, pt. II, tit. I, IV, 47 Stat. 382.
19. 76 CONG. REc. 233, 2103-26 (1932). On June 30, 1932, President Hoover
signed the legislative appropriation bill, section 2 of which, the economy act, contained
a provision for the reorganization of the executive departments, and in which the Presi-
dent was given certain limited authority to group, coordinate, and consolidate Govern-
ment activities. Acting under that authority, the President submitted on Dec. 9 a very
thorough and exhaustive message containing recommendations for the consolidation of
some 58 governmental activities. Id. at 2103.
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1933, ch. 281, tit. II, § 4, 47 Stat. 1602; Act of March 3,
1933, ch. 212, § 16, 47 Stat. 1519.
21. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 50 (1938).
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March 20, 1933, authorized him to reduce veterans' payments by
several hundred million dollars.22 The Reorganization Act of 1939,23
which declared that continuing deficits made cutbacks desirable, di-
rected the President to effect savings by consolidating or abolishing
agencies for more efficient operation. Of the five purposes identified
in the act, spending reduction was listed first.
24
Another general grant of impoundment power appeared in the
single-package ("omnibus") appropriation bill of 1950, directing the
President to cut the budget by not less than $550 million without
impairing national defense.2 5 President Truman fulfilled the statu-
tory directive by placing $572 million in reserve, including $343
million in appropriations, $119 million in contract authority, and
$110 million in authorizations to borrow from the Treasury.
2
B. Spending Ceilings
In 1967 Congress directed a spending cut of $4.3 billion. Legis-
lative action reduced spending by $1.8 billion, leaving $2.5 billion to
be trimmed by the President. The budget-cutting formula required
each civilian agency to reduce its budgeted obligations by an amount
equal to 2 percent of payroll, plus 10 percent of other controllable
obligations. Defense Department obligations were to be reduced by
an amount equal to 10 percent of non-Vietnam programs.
27
In 1968, 1969, and 1970, Congress enacted ceilings on expendi-
tures, and thereby gave the Nixon administration additional statu-
tory authority to impound funds.2 8 Policy making inevitably re-
sulted, since the administration unilaterally selected the programs to
be sacrificed.
29
22. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, 48 Stat. 8. See 2 PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 21, at 28, 51, 69.
23. Act of Apr. 3, 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561.
24. For additional background on this and other impoundment disputes, see
Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sci. Q. 361 (1970).
25. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1214, 64 Stat. 768.
26. H.R. Doc. No. 182, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
27. Act of Dec. 18, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-218, 81 Stat. 662. See 2 PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1967, at 1174.
28. Act of July 6, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-305, § 501, 84 Stat. 406; Act of July 22,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-47, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Act of June 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364,
§ 202, 82 Stat. 271. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY
106-10 (1972).
29. For a discussion of the policy-making issue, see notes 132-63 infra & accom-
panying text.
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In retaliation, Congress refused to adopt a spending ceiling in
1971. Representative Joe L. Evins explained that Congress did not
want to give the Nixon administration "a flexible ceiling which could
[be] use[d] as a tool to freeze and impound funds as [they] did in the
past."30 The subject of a spending ceiling reappeared in the fall of
1972, but the two Houses of Congress were unable to agree on a
formula which would restrict executive discretion.
31
The Ervin impoundment bill, reported out on April 17, 1973,
included a spending ceiling of $268 billion for fiscal 1974. If with-
holding were necessary to protect the ceiling, the bill provided that
it be done on a roughly proportional basis. The Ervin bill passed
the Senate three times: as an amendment to the Par Value Modifica-
tion Bill,32 as an amendment to the Debt Limit Bill,"8 and as a sep-
arate bill.34 On July 25, 1973, the House adopted a spending ceiling
with a proportional cutback formula.3
C. Antideficiency Act
The Antideficiency Act, as amended in 1950, authorizes the
President to establish budgetary reserves
to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are
made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater effi-
ciency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the date
on which such appropriation was made available.30
To comprehend the purpose and scope of this provision, it must be
viewed in the context of an earlier Post Office dispute.
In the spring of 1947, the Post Office Department announced
that it would exhaust its funds long before the end of the fiscal year.
Instead of apportioning its funds to avoid a deficiency situation (e.g.,
in roughly equal amounts by quarters), the Post Office allotted $370
30. Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Atomic
Energy Commission Appropriations (Part 6) Before the House Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, (1971).
31. See 118 CONG. REc. S18,633 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972); id. at S18,506-29
(daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
32. 119 CONG. REc. S6696 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1973).
33. Id. at S12,169 (daily ed. June 27, 1973). Rejected by conferees, id, at H5721
(daily ed. June 29, 1973); id. at S12,710-11 (daily pd. June 30, 1973).
34. Id. at S8871 (daily ed. May 10, 1973).
35. 119 CONG. RFc. H6626 (daily ed. July 25, 1973).
36. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1211, 64 Stat. 765 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §
665(c) (2) (1970)).
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million for the first quarter, $409 million for the second, $364 million
for the third, and only $9.5 million for the final quarter. Congress
found itself in a predicament: If it did not provide extra money in a
deficiency bill, the Post Office would have to suspend operations.3
The difficulties of the Post Office caused the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee to request that the Bureau of the Budget (herein-
after referred to as "BOB") and the General Accounting Office (here-
inafter referred to as "GAO") recommend ways to improve the Anti-
deficiency Act.38 The resulting joint BOB-GAO report began with the
assumption that it was impossible to completely eliminate deficiencies;
changing conditions, unforeseen at appropriation time, would always
breed new expenses. The report noted, however, that changing con-
ditions should also produce surpluses by way of overfunding. Unless
some action was taken to conserve these excess funds, they might be ob-
ligated by the end of the fiscal year "even though there may be no es-
sential need thereof."3 9
The obvious means for avoiding deficiency bills in the future
was to encourage the setting aside of surpluses. A draft bill prepared
by the BOB and the GAO recommended this language:
In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established
to provide for contingencies or to effect savings whenever savings
are made possible by or through changes in quantitative or personnel
requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other developments
subsequent to the date on which such appropriation was made avail-
able.
40
Section 1211 of the 1950 omnibus appropriation act closely followed
the BOB-GAO language:
In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established
to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are
made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater effi-
ciency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the date
on which such appropriation was made available.
41
37. Hearings on Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1947 Before the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 125, 137 (1947).
38. Id. at 142-43.
39. Director of the Bureau of the Budget & Comptroller General of the United
States, Report and Recommendations with Respect to the Antideficiency Act and Re-
lated Legislation and Procedures 7 (mimeographed report with appendices submitted
to Senator Styles Bridges, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, June 5, 1947).
40. Id. (§ (c) (2) of draft bill).
41. See Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1211, 64 Stat. 765.
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The legislative history of this provision clearly demonstrates that
its purpose was to build up surpluses in some accounts as a means of
balancing deficiencies elsewhere. Nowhere was there an implied au-
thority to set aside reserves to cancel or curtail a program. On the
contrary, immediately after the above cited passage the Act provides
that
[w]henever it is determined by an officer designated in subsection (d)
of this section to make apportionments and reapportionments that
any amount so reserved vill not be required to carry out the purposes
of the appropriation concerned, he shall recommend the rescission of
such amount in the manner provided in the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921, for estimates of appropriations.
42
In short, if an administrator could execute a program by spend-
ing fewer dollars than appropriated, all well and good. But the pur-
pose of the appropriation itself was not to be denied.
This was a well established policy. The BOB-GAO report had
cautioned that the authority to set aside reserves "must be exercised
with considerable care in order to avoid usurping the powers of Con-
gress." 43 The same position was taken two years later by the Hoover
Commission when it recommended that the President "should have
authority to reduce expenditures under appropriations, if the pur-
poses intended by the Congress are still carried out.144 In reporting
out the antideficiency language in 1950, the House Appropriations
Committee explained that this grant of authority to set aside reserves
was not to be taken as "justification for the thwarting of a major policy
of Congress by the impounding of funds." 45 The intent of the 1950
language was amplified by the BOB in its Examiners Handbook for
1952: "Reserves must not be used to nullify the intent of Congress
with respect to specific projects or level of programs." 46
Roy L. Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(hereinafter referred to as "OMB"), during the Nixon administra-
tion, argued that inflationary pressures can be considered "other de-
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. BOB-GAO Report at 21.
44. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, BUDOETINO AND
ACcOUNTING, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 17 (1949).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950).
46. Williams, The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget 32, Inter-
University Case Program #28 (1955), reprinted in 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note
12, at 859.
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velopments" within the meaning of the Antideficiency Act and thus
an authority for withholding funds.47 However, there is nothing in
either the language or the history of the Antideficiency Act to sup-
port that proposition.
D. Employment Act of 1946
Caspar W. Weinberger told a Senate committee on January 17,
1973, that the Employment Act of 194648 "requires the President to
maintain policies that guard against inflation." 49 That is inaccurate.
The Act merely requires the President to present an economic report
to Congress. 50 It did not confer upon the President any special pow-
ers. The Act's goals of maximum employment, production, and pur-
chasing power were to be the responsibility of the entire federal gov-
ernment.
Furthermore, the Act did not confer any discretionary spending
power upon the President. Significantly, Section 6 of the Employ-
ment Bill of 1945 did contain discretionary spending authority, allow-
ing the President to vary expenditure levels in whatever manner he
determined to be necessary for the purpose of "assisting in assur-
ing" full employment, but that section was conspicuously absent from
the Employment Act of 1946. 51
As a final point, the Employment Act of 1946 was enacted as an
instrument for countering a possible postwar depression. Maximizing
purchasing power, a primary goal, was to be attained by promoting em-
ployment and production. Impoundment has precisely the opposite
effect.
E. Economic Stabilization Act
Deputy Attorney General Joseph T. Sneed told a Senate commit-
tee on February 6, 1973, that President Nixon had
47. 1973 Ervin Hearings at 286. The author discusses the history of the Anti-
deficiency Act more thoroughly in id. at 395-99.
48. Act of Feb. 20, 1946, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 24 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25
(1970)).
49. Hearings on Caspar W. Weinberger To Be Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Part 1) Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1973).
50. Act of Feb. 20, 1946, cl. 33, § 3, 60 Stat. 24 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1022
(1970)).
51. S. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW 248 (1950); S. 380, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945), as introduced on Jan. 22, 1945 and referred to the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency.
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substantial latitude to refuse to spend or to defer spending for general
fiscal reasons, such as control of inflation. This view is supported by
the Congressional intent revealed by the Employment Act of 1946,
the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, and the debt
limit imposed by Public Law 92-599.52
A report by OMB also cited the Economic Stabilization Act as au-
thority and reason for withholding funds from a number of projects:
the Appalachian regional development programs, rural electrification
loans, FHA rural water and waste disposal grants, federal aid to high-
ways, payment to the Tennessee Valley Authority Fund, and several
housing and urban development programs.5 3
On February 19, 1973, Senator Eagleton introduced an amend-
ment to provide that nothing in the Economic Stabilization Act "may
be construed to authorize or require the withholding or reservation
of any obligational authority provided by law, or of any funds ap-
propriated under such authority."5 4 The Eagleton amendment was
incorporated into a bill to extend and amend the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act 55 and was enacted into law on April 30, 1973.5"
F. Public Debt Limit
Several administrations have relied on the debt ceiling as au-
thority for withholding funds. In 1957, in order to keep within the
statutory debt limit imposed by Congress, the Eisenhower adminis-
tration issued a series of orders and announcements for cutbacks and
stretchouts in defense programs. 57 When Congress later raised the
debt limit, the money was released. 58 The "debt ceiling" argument
has also been invoked frequently by the Nixon administration. 0
52. 1973 Ervin Hearings at 366.
53. 38 Fed. Reg. 3475 [Code 6c], 3476-93 (1973).
54. 119 CONG. REc. S2682 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1973).
55. S. REP. No. 63, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973).
56. Act of Apr. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, § 4, 87 Stat. 28.
57. Rep. Mahon explained the stretchout policy at 103 CONG. REc. A7337
(1957). In brief, the stretchout policy involves slowing down the rate of expenditures
during a given fiscal year, and spending the balance in subsequent years.
58. Budget Director Stans said that funds were released after the debt ceiling was
raised. Hearings on the Budget for 1960 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1959).
59. See 1973 Ervin Hearings at 270, 366-77; 1971 Ervin Hearings at 96; Hear-
ings on Withholding of Funds for Housing and Urban Development Programs, Fiscal
Year 1971, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1971).
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In adhering to a debt limit established by Congress, an adminis-
tration is nevertheless able to give preference to its own programs
and priorities. Thus, the Nixon administration extended revenue
sharing to the states without feeling constrained by the debt limit,
while at the same time it withheld funds from a number of other
programs ostensibly on the ground that the debt limit could not ac-
commodate them.
G. Discretionary Language
Statutes frequently provide for discretionary spending authority,
which is sometimes explicit in the statute itself, sometimes implicit
in the statute's legislative history.
Explicit authority is illustrated by the Labor-HEW appropria-
tion bill for fiscal 1970. President Nixon vetoed the bill on January
26, 1970, because it provided $1.3 billion more than he had re-
quested.0° After sustaining6' the President's veto, Congress reduced
the appropriation from $19.7 billion to $19.3 billion-still $900
million more than Nixon had desired. But in order to avert the
possibility of a second veto, the bill included a provision that limited
expenditures to 98 percent of appropriations, provided that no amount
specified in the appropriation could be cut by more than 15 percent.
The 2-percent cutback allowed for a further spending reduction of
$347 million. President Nixon signed the amended bill.62
A similar situation arose three years later. President Nixon vetoed
the fiscal 1973 Labor-HEW appropriation bill, which was $1.8 billion
higher than he had requested. 63 Congress passed the bill again, this
time including presidential authority to withhold from obligation and
expenditure as much as $1.2 billion, provided that no activity would
be reduced by more than 13 percent.64 In contrast with his action
three years earlier, the President pocket vetoed the amended bill.65
The Labor-HEW appropriation bill for fiscal 1974, enacted into
law, 6 authorizes the President to withhold up to $400 million, with
60. 116 CON(. REC. 1365-67 (1970).
61. Id. at 1552.
62. Act of Mar. 5, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-204, § 410, 84 Stat. 48. See discussion
at 116 CONG. REC. 5926-27 (1970).
63. 8 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1240 (1972).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1591, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972).
65. 8 WEEKLY COMOP. PRES. Doc. 1578 (1972).
66. Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-192.
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the restriction that none of the appropriations, activities, programs
and projects may be reduced by more than 5 percent. If the discre-
tion is used to its fullest, the statute will exceed the President's budget
request by approximately 5978 million.
67
A more difficult area, concerning the degree of spending discre-
tion implicit in an act, is illustrated by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972.08
H. Other Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions
The President has been granted discretionary spending powers
in a variety of other legislative formulations. For example, he has
been directed to withhold economic assistance in an amount equiva-
lent to that spent by an underdeveloped country for the purchase of
sophisticated weapons systems, unless he informs Congress that the
withholding of such assistance would be detrimental to national se-
curity.69 Economic assistance is not to be furnished to any nation
"whose government is based upon that theory of government known
as communism," unless the President determines that the withholding
of such assistance would be contrary to the national interest.70 An
overthrow of a regime by "communist" forces might therefore be a
basis for cutting off assistance. Furthermore, according to the "Hic-
kenlooper amendment," if a foreign government seizes any property
from U.S. corporations and fails to compensate them within a reason-
able amount of time, the President is required to suspend assistance."
The 1964 Civil Rights Act empowers the President to withhold
funds from federally financed programs in which there is discrimina-
tion by race, color, or national origin.72 On the basis of that provi-
sion, special desegregation grants may be terminated when school
districts violate civil rights requirements.
States that fail to enact billboard control legislation, as required
67. H.R. REP. No. 682, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
68. See notes 206-35 infra & accompanying text.
69. Act of Feb. 9, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-194, § 119, 84 Stat. 10; 22 U.S.C. §
2370(s) (1970).
70. Act of Feb. 9, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-194, § 109(b), 84 Stat. 9; 22 U.S.C. §
2370(f) (1970).
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1970). That provision has been applied only once,
against Ceylon in 1963. Hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appro-
priations for 1973 (Part 2) Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 142 (1972).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (1970).
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by the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, have been
threatened with a loss of federal aid for highway improvement. 73 A
1968 act requires states to update their welfare payments standards
in order to reflect cost-of-living increases. 7 4 Failure to comply with




Legislative efforts to control impoundment have been resisted
by the Nixon administration as a "serious infringement" upon the
President's constitutional responsibility to execute the laws enacted
by Congress. The establishment and release of budgetary reserves was
regarded as an action of "an administrative nature, fully consistent
with the President's constitutional duty to 'take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.' "76 A more general proposition by the Nixon
administration rested on the belief that the President's authority to
establish reserves "is derived basically from the constitutional provi-
sions which vest the executive power of the President."
77
This latter proposition opens the door to the shadowy area of
73. Washington Evening Star, Feb. 27, 1971, at A2, col. 6; Washington Post,
Feb. 12, 1972, at A4, col. 1.
74. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 898, § 213(b) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (1970)).
75. HEW threatened during 1971 to cut off relief funds from California, Indiana,
Nebraska, and Arizona. See National Journal, Feb. 20, 1971, at 401-09; N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1971, at 24, col. 3; id., Mar. 29, 1971, at 19, col. 1; id., Jan. 20, 1971, at 15,
col. 1; Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1971, at A18, col. 1; id., Jan. 9, 1971, at A2, col. 1;
id., Jan. 8, 1971, at A5, col. 6.
76. Hearings on the Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1973, Before the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1972) (statement by the
Office of Management and Budget). Repeated, Feb. 1, 1973, by OMB Director Roy L.
Ash, in 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 272.
77. 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note 14, at 95. In his statement of Feb. 1, 1973,
OMB Director Ash said that the
detailed administration of projects, the negotiating and letting of contracts,
the identification of payees and determination of their eligibility for payment,
and the essential exercise of judgment in the normal conduct of Government
operations-all of these, by their very nature, are clearly executive functions.
These functions are undeniably within the executive authority. Indeed, he has
an absolute responsibility to carry out these functions.
1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 270. At the latter hearings, Deputy Attorney
General Sneed doubted whether Congress can legislate against impoundment, even in
the domestic area: "To admit the existence of such power deprives the President of a
substantial portion of the 'executive power' vested in him by the Constitution .... Id.,
at 369.
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implied powers. And yet, to deny the President any discretion and
judgment over the expenditure of funds, other than what Congress
specifically delegates to him, would convert his office from that of
Chief Executive to Chief Clerk7s It would prevent the executive
branch from making the kinds of decisions previously described as
"efficient management." 79 Finally, it would carry to extremes the
Brandeis dictum that the doctrine of separated powers was adopted
"not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power."80 The period from 1774 to 1787 furnishes ample proof that
the framers indeed intended to create a separate executive branch for
the purpose of imparting efficiency and accountability to government."1
The issue is thus not whether a degree of discretion and judg-
ment is implied in Article II of the Constitution. 2 Rather, inquiry
must be made as to the boundaries of that discretion.
B. Foreign Affairs
Officials of the Nixon administration have argued that the Presi-
dent's discretion to withhold funds is especially broad in the area of
foreign affairs. In a statement before the Ervin-Chiles impoundment
hearings on February 6, 1973, Assistant Attorney General Sneed of-
fered these remarks:
The President has substantial authority to control spending in
the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Such authority
flows from the President's constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces and from his relatively broad constitutional
authority in the field of foreign affairs.
8 3
In [the areas of national defense and foreign relations] Congres-
sional directives to spend may intrude impermissibly into matters re-
78. Id. (statement by Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
79. See notes 4-17 supra & accompanying text.
80. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
81. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 1-27, 241-70 (1972); Fisher, The Eff-
ciency Side. of Separated Powers, 5 J. AMERICAN STUDIES 113 (1971); Fisher, Presi-
dential Tat Discretion and Eighteenth Century Theory, 23 WESTERN POL. Q. 151
(1970).
82. L. FISHER, supra note 81, at 29-42.
83. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 368, citing United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). The sweeping assertions by Mr.
Justice Sutherland in the Curtiss-Wright case rest on an overly simplistic dichotomy be-
tween foreign affairs and domestic affairs. Executive commitments abroad have sharply
reduced the availability of funds for domestic programs. See L. FISHER, supra note 81,
at 64-65, 117-18, 127-31.
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served by the Constitution to the President. It is noteworthy that
Congress has never successfully challenged an impounding action in
the foreign relations and national defense fields.84
Of course, ample statutory authority exists for withholding foreign
assistance funds.8 5 If the President were to withhold funds he would
be acting in support of congressional policy, not in defiance of it.
Moreover, the administrative patterns in foreign assistance is not to
impound funds but to spend every available dollar. In 1971, when
it was learned that a series of domestic programs had been affected
by impoundment, congressional hearings revealed that not one dime
had been withheld from projects overseas.86 This led to a provision
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, prohibiting the obligation or
expenditure of funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Foreign Military Sales Act unless certain funds withheld from the
Departments of Agriculture, HEW, and HUD were released.87 A simi-
lar effort was made in 1973 to make the expenditure of foreign as-
sistance funds contingent upon the release of domestic funds. 8
C. Commander in Chief
Assistant Attorney General Sneed's contention that there exists
executive authority for impoundment of funds in national defense
and foreign relations matters relies upon the President's constitutional
role as Commander in Chief.89 The scope of that constitutional provi-
84. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 368.
85. See notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
86. Hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1972
Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 275-77 (Part 1), 70,
181-91, 351-55 (Part 2) (1971).
87. Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-226, § 658, 86 Stat. 32. The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations explained that the purpose of the impoundment pro-
vision was to tell the American taxpayers: "You will be assured of getting the funds
appropriated by Congress for domestic programs and projects before additional foreign
aid funds can be obligated for similar programs and projects in Rio de Janiero, Nairobi
or New Delhi." S. REP. No. 432, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971). The General Ac-
counting Office subsequently reported that the domestic funds in question had been
released. 118 CONG. REC. H4098 (daily ed. May 3, 1972).
88. Id. at H4583-85 (daily ed. June 11, 1973); 119 CONG. REC. S2431-33 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1973). The Nixon administration's first impoundment report, in response
to P.L. 92-599, included various types of withholdings, including Code 8: "The Presi-
dent's constitutional authority and responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs (U.S.
Constitution, Article II, section 2)." No funds were withheld for that reason, 38 Fed.
Reg. 3475 (1973).
89. See note 83 supra & accompanying text.
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sion remains a source of continuing dispute. As Mr. Justice Jackson
once said of the Commander in Chief clause:
These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent
controversies in our constitutional history. Of course, they imply
something more than an empty title. But just what authority goes
with the name has plagued presidential advisers who would not
waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins
or ends.90
1. During Wartime. Impoundment pursuant to this authority was
used before, during, and after World War II, sparking objections
from some members of Congress but without creating a major crisis.
With war imminent in January 1941, President Roosevelt told Con-
gress that it seemed appropriate to "defer construction projects that
interfere with the defense program by diverting manpower and ma-
terials." 91 Despite some opposition, the Roosevelt administration was
generally able to withhold funds from domestic projects in order to
promote the war effort. 92 When Congress authorized public works
projects in December 1944 and in March 1945, it did so in the "in-
terest of the national security" and for the purpose of providing a
reservoir of useful projects during the postwar period. Projects were
to be initiated "as expeditiously and prosecuted as vigorously as may
be consistent with budgetary requirements." 93 No project was to be
funded or constructed until six months after the end of the war, un-
less recommended by an authorized defense agency and approved
by the President as being "necessary or desirable in the interest of
the national defense and security, and the President had notified the
Congress to that effect."
9 4
Surrender of the Axis powers left the federal government with
tens of billions of dollars in excess of military needs. That balance
was brought under control by Congress (rescinding appropriations)
and by the President (impounding funds). In June 1944, Congress
directed the President to undertake a continuous study of war ap-
propriations and contract authorizations so that he would be able to
90. Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952).
91. 9 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 656 (1941).
92. See Williams, supra note 46.
93. See Act of Mar. 2, 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 11; Act of Dec. 22, 1944, cit.
665, § 10, 58 Stat. 891.
94. Act of Mar. 2, 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 12.
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recommend the rescission of appropriations no longer needed.95 The
following year it called upon the administration to reduce the num-
ber of federal employees and to bring about the reduction of ad-
ministrative costs by way of reorganization. Savings were to be placed
in reserve and returned to the Treasury.9 6 Also in 1945, Congress
passed the first rescission bill, cancelling a number of funds previously
appropriated. 7
In September 1945, President Truman submitted to Congress a
series of proposed reductions in the civilian war agencies and in the
naval and military establishments. The proposed rescissions of ap-
propriations and contract authorizations came to approximately $49
billion. 98 But when Congress passed the rescission bill, it included a
rider to require decentralization of public employment offices. Tru-
man opposed this latter provision both in substance and procedure,
insisting that such issues "should not be dealt with as riders to ap-
propriation bills." He refused to sign the bill into law, yet he told
Congress that he would heed those sections which dealt with rescis-
sions. He then directed the BOB to designate those amounts as non-
expendable.99
Congress responded by passing a number of statutes to rescind
appropriations and contract authority. 100 Spending reductions for the
budget year ending June 30, 1946, eventually came to $55 billion.'0 '
Thus, under appropriate conditions, Congress as well as the President
can "impound" appropriations previously made.
2. Peacetime Military Procurement. Prior to the Nixon adminis-
tration, most of the controversial impoundment actions involved
weapons systems. The complicated political setting of this type of ac-
tion may be illustrated by providing details of two major examples:
one involving Air Force funds withheld by Truman and the other
95. Act of June 28, 1944, ch. 304, § 303, 58 Stat. 623.
96. Act of Dec. 20, 1945, ch. 582, §§ 3, 10, 59 Stat. 617; Act of June 30,
1945, ch. 212, § 607, 59 Stat. 304.
97. Act of July 3, 1945, ch. 266, 59 Stat. 407.
98. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN, 1945, at 259, 320, 343.
99. Id. at 579.
100. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 357, 61 Stat. 572; Act of July 23, 1946, ch. 591,
60 Stat. 600; Act of May 27, 1946, ch. 271, 60 Stat. 221; Act of Feb. 18, 1946,
ch. 30, 60 Stat. 6.
101. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN, 1947, at 385. See id. 1946, at 17, 288; id. 1947, at 100.
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concerning funds for B-70 bombers during the Kennedy administra-
tion.
In 1949 Congress voted to increase President Truman's Air Force
request from 48 to 58 groups. Truman countered by placing the un-
wanted funds, totaling $735 million, in reserve. Several factors pro-
duced this collision between the two branches.
First, Louis Johnson, who replaced James Forrestal in March
1949 as the new Defense Secretary, subjected the military budget to
fresh scrutiny. Even though the Berlin airlift was in operation and
the Korean War little more than a year away, Johnson was optimistic
about the chances for peace. 0 2 This period was also dominated by
the theory that it was the intention of Soviet Russia to force the
United States to spend so much on defense that this would bankrupt
the American economy. Instead of aiming for a military victory, it
was widely believed that Russia planned to undermine the American
economy-to "bleed the economy to death.' u0 3
Retrenchment in defense spending became even more likely when
the Eberstadt task force of the Hoover Commission released its find-
ings on the Pentagon. In December 1948 the task force criticized the
military services for hampering defense policy with their fierce rival-
ries. More directly to the point, the services lacked a "sense of cost
consciousness" and were "far too prodigal" with government funds. 04
The following April former President Hoover advised Congress that
$1.5 billion could be cut from the military budget without impairing
national security.105 In June, Franz Schneider, who had headed the
Eberstadt study of the fiscal 1950 budget, told a Senate committee
that defense savings could run as high as $2 billion.00
Secretary Johnson, who considered the defense budget too small
when he presented it in 1949, nevertheless concluded that larger ap-
propriations-because of waste within the Pentagon-would be
throwing money "down a rat hole."1 07
Still another factor was Truman's fiscal policy of relying on bud-
102. Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East (Part 4) Before the Senate
Comms. on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2607 (1951).
103. W. SCHILLING, P. HAMMOND & G. SNYDER, STRATEGY, POLITICS AND DE-
FENSE BUDGETS 103-07 (1962) [hereinafter cited as W. SCHILLINO].
104. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1948, at 18, col. 3.
105. Id., Apr. 12, 1949, at 1, col. 5.
106. W. SCHILLING, supra note 103, at 110.
107. See Hearings, supra note 102, at 2607.
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get surpluses and debt retirement to restrain inflation. Twice in 1947
he vetoed tax-reduction bills.108 In 1948, when he again vetoed a tax-
reduction bill, Democrats joined with Republicans to override him.10 9
With revenues lost to tax relief, and tax receipts down because of the
1948-49 recession, Truman had to redouble his efforts to control ex-
penditures." 0
The Senate joined with the President in opposing Air Force
funds added by the House. But as the matter lay deadlocked in con-
ference committee, the House rejected a Senate motion to vote con-
tinuing appropriations."' With adjournment close at hand and the
military services in need of payroll funds, the Senate reluctantly agreed
to the 58 groups. It did so, however, on the understanding that the
money might not be spent. Senator Elmer Thomas, a ranking Demo-
crat on the Appropriations Committee, left the impression that "if
the money is appropriated it may not be used."1 2
Truman signed the bill, announcing that he was directing his
Secretary of Defense to place the extra funds in reserve: $577 million
in contract authority for aircraft construction, $130 million for main-
tenance and operations, and lesser amounts for contingencies, special
procurement, and research and development-a total of $735 mil-
lion."13 He justified impoundment on the need to maintain a balance
between national security and a sound economy, the importance of
preserving the elements of a unified strategic concept among the mili-
tary services, and the President's authority as Commander in Chief." 4
Neither Senator McKellar nor Representative Cannon-Chair-
men of the Appropriations Committees---questioned Truman's au-
108. 93 CONG. REc. 7073-74, 9303 (1947).
109. 94 CONG. REC. 4018-19, 4026, 4051-53 (1948).
110. A. HOLMANS, UNITED STATES FISCAL POLICY: 1945-1959, at 56-84 (1961).
111. 95 CONG. REC. 14,591-92 (1949).
112. Id. at 14,355. See also Exchange between Senators Ferguson and Saltonstall,
id. at 14,855. For pointed critiques on the failure of Congress to analyze the defense
budget so as to rationally justify an expanded Air Force, see E. KOLODZIEJ, THE UN-
COMiON DEFENSE AND CONGRESS 79-81, 87-107 (1966); W. SCHILLING, supra note
103, at 71-87.
113. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN, 1949, at 538-39; Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for
1951; Additional Supplemental Hearing Before the House Comm. on Appropriations,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1950).
114. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN, 1949, at 538-39. See also Letter from Harry S. Truman to Defense Secretary
Johnson, Nov. 8, 1949, in 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note 14, at 525.
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thority to withhold the money. 115 Defense Secretary Johnson regarded
Truman's action as inherent in the President's responsibilities as Chief
Executive and Commander in Chief.116 When Truman was later asked
if he saw any conflict between his constitutional duty to enforce the
law and his impoundment of Air Force funds, he replied:
That is the discretionary power of the President. If he doesn't
feel like the money should be spent, I don't think he can be forced
to spend it. How would you go about making him spend it ... ?117
Another hotly contested impoundment action involved the B-70
bomber (later the RS-70), a long-range aircraft billed as successor to
the B-52. President Eisenhower had restricted the B-70 program to
production of prototype aircraft, to be made available in 1963 for
flight testing. Although U.S. strategy in the postwar period depended
on manned bombers, Eisenhower felt that an increasing part of the
strategic force would be composed of fixed-base and mobile ballistic
missiles. Hence, he doubted the need for B-70s in an age of ICBMs
and Polaris submarines." 8
In 1961 Congress added $180 million to the $200 million re-
quested by the Kennedy administration for development of the B-70.
Defense Secretary McNamara, stressing our advantage over the Sovi-
ets in bombers and the deterrent capability of American missile
strength, refused to release the unwanted funds."10
In March 1962 the House Armed Services Committee, under the
leadership of Carl Vinson, voted to direct the Secretary of the Air
Force to spend not less than $491 million during fiscal 1963 toward
production of the aircraft (then redesignated RS-70). The committee
figure was $320 million above the administration's request. To remove
any doubts about its intentions, the committee said that the Secretary
was "directed, ordered, mandated, and required" to spend the full
$491 million. In casting down the gauntlet, the committee declared:
115. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1949, at 3, col. 3; id. at 40, col. 5.
116. Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951 (Part 1) Before
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1950).
117. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S.
TRUMAN, 1950, at 661. For more background on the Air Force impoundment dispute,
see E. HUZAR, THE PURSE AND THE SWORD 177-92 (1950).
118. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIOHT D.
EISENHOWER, 1960-61, at 52, 951 (1961).
119. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1961, at 1, col. 5.
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"If this language constitutes a test as to whether Congress has the
power to so mandate, let the test be made .... 120
President Kennedy, in a letter to Vinson, urged that the word
"authorized" be used in place of "directed." The President contended
that the change in language would be more suitable for an authoriza-
tion bill, since funds would still have to be appropriated in a separate
bill; He also thought the wording would be "more clearly in line with
the spirit of the Constitution" and its separation of powers. Kennedy
insisted on "the full powers and discretions essential to the faithful
execution of [his] responsibilities as President and Commander in
Chief, under article II, sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution.'
1 21
Other than the backing of his own committee, Vinson was isolated
from other congressional power centers. Among the military, he was
supported only by the Air Force. The rest of the Joint Chiefs sup-
ported McNamara.1
22
Vinson also encountered stiff opposition from the House Appro-
priations Committee. Committee Chairman George H. Mahon said
that it was improper and impractical to direct the President to spend
money before it was appropriated. He was opposed to the Armed
Services Committee's directing his committee to appropriate money. 2
3
Gerald Ford, ranking minority member on House Appropriations, was
"unalterably opposed" to the use of the word "directed." According
to Ford, the "directed" language invaded the responsibilities of the
President, usurped the authority of the Appropriations Committee,
and created inflexibility in the program. 124 Opposition to the manda-
tory language came from Charles Halleck, House Minority Leader,
John McCormack, Speaker of the House, and Carl Albert, House
Majority Leader.
1 25
To assuage Vinson's embarrassment, Kennedy announced that
McNamara would initiate a "new study" of the aircraft. 26 Vinson
took the floor to claim that Congress "has made its point and ...
120. H.R. REP. No. 1406, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9 (1962).
121. 108 CONG. REC. 4694 (1962). Kennedy's reasons for holding up on the RS-
70 were given at a news conference on March 7, 1962, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962, at 202.
122. BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 17, 1962, at 34.
123. Id. See also 108 CONG. REc. 4720 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Mahon).
124. 108 CONG. REC. 4714 (1962).
125. E. KOLODZIEJ, supra note 112, at 415-17 (1966).
126. 108 CONG. REQ. 4694 (1962).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
caused the Department of Defense to see the error of their ways.'1 27
Interpretations from other Members were less flattering. Representa-
tive Leslie Arends called it a "paper victory." He said he would "await
the translation of the assurances we now have into affirmative ac-
tion."128 Representative Frank Becker claimed that McNamara's offer
was "an old legislative trick-that when you want to get rid of some-
thing, agree to a study. This is the surest way to brush something
under the rug that you want to get rid of.' 29 Representative H. R.
Gross regretted that the fight had ever started, "for it is apparent now
that it has been lost. This is not a compromise; it is a defeat for the
entire House of Representatives."'" °
The administration proceeded with its original plan to build two
prototypes of the RS-70 before considering full-scale production. One
prototype crashed in June 1966; the second ended up in the Air
Force Museum at Dayton, Ohio.131
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY MAKING
Any impoundment action by an executive official represents at
least some degree of policy making, even when in compliance with
statutory language. Policy is part of every budget and fiscal decision.
832
A few cases of impoundment, however, illustrate policy making in
such pure form that they are included here as a separate section.
A. Unwanted Projects
Prior to the 1960's, several Presidents practiced a form of "item
veto" on public works legislation-obeying certain portions of a bill
while ignoring others. Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois recalled
that an appropriation act of 1857 had failed to benefit his state. The
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4699.
129. Id. at 4707.
130. Id. at 4714.
131. For studies on the RS-70 and other impoundments of weapons systems, see
Davis, Congressional Power to Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 39
(1964); Moore, To . . .Provide for the Common Defense, in PUBLIC ADMuINISTRATION
371-400 (2d ed., R. Golembiewski, F. Gibson, G. Carnag eds. 1972); Stassen, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Impounding of Weapons
System Appropriations, 57 GEo. L.J. 1159 (1969).
132. See statement by Caspar W. Weinberger, in 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note
14, at 98.
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President had quarreled with Representatives from Illinois and penal-
ized them by withholding funds:
To this hour [in 1861], you could not get the law executed. Other
custom-houses could be built; other post offices could be made; but
not a dollar could be expended at Springfield or at Cairo, in Illinois,
although the law required it.133
In 1876, in signing a river and harbor bill, President Grant ex-
pressed his objections to particular projects:
If it was obligatory upon the Executive to expend all the money ap-
propriated by Congress, I should return the river and harbor bill with
my objections, notwithstanding the great inconvenience to the public
interests resulting therefrom and the loss of expenditures from previous
Congresses upon completed works. Without enumerating, many ap-
propriations are made for works of purely private or local interest,
in no sense national. I can not give my sanction to these, and will
take care that during my term of office no public money shall be ex-
pended upon them. 34
This selective execution of the laws occasionally received support
from influential legislators. In 1896, Senator John Sherman-second-
ranking Republican on the Finance Committee-regarded President
Cleveland's veto of a river and harbor bill as unnecessary. The ap-
propriation bill was permissive:
If the President of the United States should see proper to say, "That
object of appropriation is not a wise one; I do not concur that the
money ought to be expended," that is the end of it. There is no occa-
sion for the veto power in a case of that kind.a35
In 1923, President Harding threatened to use his impoundment
power to curb river and harbor spending. Whether he could have won
this confrontation with Congress is academic; within a matter of
months he was dead, and there is no evidence to suggest that his suc-
cessor was inclined to impound the funds. 36
With regard to a dispute in the early 1940's concerning the Kings
133. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1177 (1861).
134. 9 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4331 (J.
Richardson ed. 1925).
135. 28 CONG. REc. 6031 (1896).
136. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1923, at 4, col. 6; id., Jan. 23, 1923, at 20, col. 2. See.
64 CONG. REc. 3507 (1923).
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River Project in California's Central Valley Basin, President Roose-
velt instructed his Secretary of War not to allocate any lunds or sub-
mit any estimates for appropriations without review by the BOB and
by the President.137 When Congress funded the project in the spring
of 1946, President Truman announced that he would submit his own
plan for developing water resources in that area. He then impounded
the funds pending a determination of the prospective costs. In Febru-
ary 1947, after he submitted his report to Congress, Truman released
the money.1
38
In 1965 a dispute over legislative procedures led to impoundment
of funds for small watershed projects. Instead of vetoing a river and
harbor bill, President Johnson noted his opposition to a committee-
veto provision and asked that it be repealed in the next session. Con-
gress refused and the funds for small watershed projects remained
impounded. 139 On March 27, 1969, President Nixon advised his Secre-
tary of Agriculture that he would not object to the committee-veto
procedure. 40 A list of 18 projects was submitted to Congress on June
30 for committee approval.' 4'
In a fiscal 1966 appropriation, Congress provided $9.2 million for
construction of a national aquarium. 42 The Johnson and Nixon ad-
ministrations impounded practically the entire amount. 43 On Jafnuary
19, 1971, President Nixon halted construction of the $180 million
Cross Florida Barge Canal, a project that was years in the making and
more than one-third complete. The project was halted, the President
said, "to prevent serious environmental damages.'1 44
Lastly, during December 1972 and January 1973, the Nixon ad-
137. A. MAASS, MUDDY WATERS: THE ARMY ENGINEERS AND THE NATION'S
RIVERS 237 (1951). The dispute involved a contest between the Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation. Id. at 215.
138. H.R. Doc. No. 136, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947); PUBLIC PAPERS or THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1946, at 229-30.
139. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, 1965, at 1083.
140. Department of Agriculture Release No. 1015-69 (1969).
141. Forwarded to the author by Senator Talmadge, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Watershed Projects of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. For entire
list of 96 projects affected by the Johnson impoundment, see 115 CONo. REc. 5923
(1969).
142. 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note 14, at 217.
143. Id. at 139-42, 211-17.
144. 7 WEEKLY Comsp. PRES. Doe. 81 (1971). See 117 CONO. Ran. E2195 (daily
ed. Mar. 25, 1971) (statements by Rep. Bennett); 118 CoNG. REc. H4668 (daily ed.
May 17, 1972) (statement by Rep. Sikes).
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ministration announced the termination or postponement of numerous
agricultural, environmental and housing programs. 45
B. Anti-inflation Policy
In signing an agricultural appropriation bill in 1966, President
Johnson was displeased that Congress had added $312.5 million to his
budget request. "During a period," he said, "when we are making
every effort to moderate inflationary pressures, this degree of increase
is . . .most unwise." Instead of vetoing the bill, and losing funds he
wanted, he reduced expenditures for certain items "in an attempt to
avert expending more in the coming year than provided in the bud-
get.1"'
President Johnson's economic message to Congress, on September
8, 1966, estimated that spending had to be cut by $3 billion to protect
the nation's economy. Whenever possible, appropriations surpassing
the President's recommendations would be withheld.147 After the No-
vember elections, Johnson announced a $5.3 billion reduction in fed-
eral programs, requiring more than a $3 billion reduction for the
remaining seven months of the fiscal year.148
The Nixon administration's anti-inflation policy was buttressed
by congressionally-enacted spending ceilings for fiscal years 1969, 1970,
and 1971. 4° Apart from those statutory limitations, however, the Presi-
dent relied upon general executive authority to restrain inflationary
pressures.
For example, the spending ceiling established in July 1969 ranged
from $191.9 billion to $193.9 billion (to allow for uncontrollables),
plus whatever Congress wanted to add to the budget. But the Presi-
dent announced his intention to follow his own ceiling of $192.9 bil-
lion., 50
During the fall of 1970, while signing an authorization bill for
sewer and water lines, President Nixon warned that appropriations in
excess of his budget would have a "disastrous fiscal effect." Nixon
145. See Part II infra.
146. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, 1966, at 980. See also notes 108-10, 114 supra & accompanying text (anti-
inflationary efforts by President Truman).
147. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, 1966, at 987-88.
148. 2 id. at 1406-10.
149. See note 28 supra.
'150. 5 WEELY Corxp. PRESS. Doc. 1142, 1759 (1969).
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said that in the event that Congress refused to exercise restraint, "I
must and will act to avoid the harmful fiscal consequences of this
legislation. I will be compelled to withhold any overfunding." 151 The
following day he signed a public works appropriation bill, stating his
intention to consider all means possible "to minimize the impact of
these inflationary and unnecessary appropriations, including the defer-
ment of the proposed starts and the withholding of funds."
1 2
The Nixon administration went ahead with the public works
projects that it had recommended. It also deferred, without excep-
tion, all of the additional projects that Congress had added. Caspar
Weinberger offered this explanation to a House subcommittee: "Given
the necessity for retrenchment in some areas, I think it is inevitable
that the ,President would feel that the items he included were items
that should be released first. " 153
Why only the President's items? Did the executive branch enjoy
some special technical or professional advantage in selecting top-pri-
ority projects? The administration made no effort to justify its choices
in terms of project merit, such as cost-benefit ratios or any other cri-
teria.
Weinberger even acknowledged that congressional committees ex-
plored in "much greater depth" than OMB the technical merits of
public works projects:
The point I made is that the discretion we exercise is done on a
single basis, the idea that the President's budget should stand and
that all of the congressional add-ons be deferred, when a deferral is
necessary in this amount, rather than exercising a cavalier or an inde-
pendent judgment on individual projects. We don't feel qualified to
- do that.1
4
OMB depended on advice from the Corps of Engineers or the Bureau
of Reclamation as to which projects had lower priority-"by definition
those projects that are not included in the budget .... ,,'5 In short,
151. 6 id. at 1343 (1970).
152. Id. at 1349.
153. Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Atomic
Energy Commission Appropriations (Part 6) Before the House Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
154. Id. at 19.
155. Id. at 17. Still another explanation for impounding all of the new congres-
sional projects was that it seemed more "impartial" to do it that way. It was argued
that a more selective list, impounding projects in some congressional districts while allow-
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instead of treating the budget as a set of recommendations, to be acted
on at the discretion of Congress, OMB decided that "the President's
budget should stand and that all of the congressional add-ons be de-
ferred .... 156
In the fall of 1972, after Congress had refused to establish a
spending ceiling, President Nixon announced that he intended to
"use every weapon at [his] command" to hold spending in fiscal 1973
as close as possible to $250 billion.157 Having asked for a statutory
ceiling of $250 billion, and having been rejected, the President pro-
ceeded to adopt that figure as an administration target, impounding
whatever funds were necessary to stay within that limit. Speaker Al-
bert commented that this action made "a monkey out of the legisla-
tive process."'158
C. Shifting Priorities
After inheriting the "Great Society" programs of the Johnson
years, President Nixon relied on impoundment to move toward his
own priorities. During the latter part of 1969 and into 1970, the Nixon
administration announced plans to reduce research health grants,
Model Cities funds, and grants for urban renewal to help check in-
flation.'5 9 The President's critics noted that these cutbacks were made
at the same time the administration was sponsoring such costly projects
as the supersonic transport, a manned landing on Mars, revenue shar-
ing, a larger merchant marine fleet, and the Safeguard ABM system.
In the spring of 1971, the Nixon administration reported that
it was withholding more than $12 billion, most of which consisted of
highway money and funds for various urban programs.160 It became
ing other add-ons to go forward, might have invited charges of discrimination and po-
litical favoritism. Id. at 10-11.
156. Id. at 19.
157. 8 WEEKLY COOiP. PREs. Doe. 1553 (1972). The fiscal 1974 budget reduced
and terminated a number of programs in order to adhere to the President's $250 billion
target. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 47-57 (1973). For two recent decisions striking
down the Nixon administration's argument that it could withhold highway funds to
combat inflation, see State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo.
1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
158. Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1973, at A4, col. 1.
159. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 8; id., Oct. 2, 1969, at 28, col. 1; id.,
Sept. 16, 1969, at 16, col. 1; id., Sept. 13, 1969, at 1, col. 4; id., Sept. 11, 1969, at 1,
col 1.
160. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 877-79; 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra
note 14, at 164-65.
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evident that part of the withholding was tied to the administration's
desire to drop the system of categorical grant-in-aid programs in favor
of bloc grants and general revenue sharing. When Congressman Zab-
locki complained about the impoundment of water and sewer funds,
he was told by Weinberger that the administration
shares your concern over the public facility needs of cities.... How-
ever, the President firmly believes that revenue sharing represents a
much more effective way of helping local governments provide for
local needs than the narrowly-focused categorical grant programs
which now exist.' 6 '
This was the administration's way of saying that it intended to imple-
ment a program which was not yet law, but would not implement a
program already authorized and funded.
The withholding of water and sewer grants was defended in 1972
by OMB Director George Shultz:
I might say that this is one area where there are some funds in
reserve that are restrictive in nature. I think it reflects our feelings
that while other funds will be released by the end of the fiscal year,
we can appropriately drag our feet just a little bit while the Congress
examines the extent to which it wants to transfer to the Federal
Government what has historically been a function of local govern-
ment, usually financed by the people who benefit directly. 1 2
This is essentially a states' rights argument, perhaps compatible with
the political philosophy of John Calhoun and John Taylor, but not
even remotely supported by statutory authority, by constitutional
grants of power, or by the present distribution of power between the
federal government and the states.'6 The argument is not consistent
with the reality of federal financing of health, education, and welfare
-responsibilities which also at one time were "a function of local gov-
ernment." Consistency in this position would require the Nixon ad-
ministration to withhold from local governments still other funds for
161. 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note 14, at 310.
162. Hearings on the Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year, 1973, Before the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1972).
163. In his budget message for the fiscal 1974 budget, President Nixon quoted the
tenth amendment and said that the "philosophy of the Founding Fathers embodied in
this amendment is also my philosophy." UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDOET, THE
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 11 (1973). For
comments on the tenth amendment, see L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONORES 37-39
(1972).
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programs which the President strongly supports, such as law-enforce-
ment grants.
PART II
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S "GOOD FAITH" EFFORTS:
THREE CASE HISTORIES
The examples offered in the first part of this article are illustra-
tive of the broad areas of spending flexibility available to the execu-
tive branch. Discretion and judgment are essential qualities of execu-
tive power. And yet the fact that spending flexibility exists does not
indicate that an administration may operate without limits. A lack
of mandatory language cannot be taken to mean that an administra-
tion is at liberty to ignore a program in its entirety. In such cases
an unwritten code of custom and interbranch comity obliges execu-
tive officials to operate on a good faith basis, preserving a foundation
of trust with Congress and its committees.
This nonstatutory system of controls, constructed over a period
of decades, has collapsed in recent years. The Nixon administration
has ignored its "good faith" obligations and stretched discretionary
authority beyond its customary limits. In self-defense, Congress has
begun to delete from legislation various forms of executive spending
discretion. The three case histories offered here provide concrete evi-
dence of congressional disapproval.
I. AGRICULTURE
During December 1972, the Nixon administration made whole-
sale reductions in farm programs. The first two casualties were the
$225.5 million Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP)
and the $10 million Water Bank Program. Subsequently, the adminis-
tration also terminated the emergency disaster loan program (of the
Farmers Home Administration), the rural electrification program and
the water and sewer grant programs.
A. REAP and Water Bank
The Rural Environmental Assistance Program operated to relieve
the problem of water pollution caused by sediment; the Water Bank
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Program was established to preserve wetlands for waterfowl. Both
programs were terminated on December 26, 1972. A legal memoran-
dum from the Department of Agriculture argued that the action was
"consistent with provisions of the legislation authorizing the REAP
and Water Bank Programs since that legislation authorizes but does
not require that the programs be carried out by the Secretary."10
"Since it is clear," the memorandum continued, "that neither the
substantive legislation nor the appropriation act compels the obli-
gation and expenditure of the full amount authorized but merely au-
thorizes a program to be carried out, it is our opinion that the pro-
gram may be legally terminated."'165 That is a wholly remarkable in-
terpretation since Congress authorized and funded a program after
holding hearings, writing committee reports, and enacting a bill into
law.
The response from Congress was predictable. In place of discre-
tionary language, Congress inserted mandatory clauses. The House
Committee on Agriculture said that while it normally sought to give
the Secretary "maximum discretion in administering the programs
assigned him by the Congress as a contribution toward sound ad-
ministration, the REAP termination signals an abuse of that discre-
tion."'16 6 Instead of providing that the Secretary "shall have power" to
carry out REAP, the committee proposed that he "shall" carry it
out. Instead of allowing the Secretary to make payments "in amounts
determined by the Secretary to be fair and reasonable," he was di-
rected to make payments "in an aggregate amount equal to the sums
appropriated therefor . . .,.
The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry added the
requirement that the Water Bank Program "shall" be carried out.168
The bill was amended on the Senate floor by deleting from the
Water Bank Act the words "shall have authority to" and replacing
164. Memorandum from Edward M. Shulman, General Counsel, to Kenneth E.
Frick, Administrator of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, in H.R.
REP. No. 6, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
165. Id. at 4. A letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States, to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., July 26, 1973, B-135564, at 25, stated: "[W]e do
not believe it follows that by employing permissive language the Congress envisions the
bulk of appropriations acts as carrying with them the seeds of their own destruction in
the form of an unrestricted license to impound."
166. H.R. REP. No. 6, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973).
167. Id. at 11.
168. S. REP. No. 49, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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them with language directing that the Secretary "shall, to the full ex-
tent permitted by available appropriations therefor.' 16 9 Because of
differences between the two houses,170 and because of some doubts as to
whether either house had the two-thirds majority needed to override
a veto, the bill was not presented to the President.
Another effort was made to reinstate REAP by amending, on the
Senate floor, the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act.' 7 ' Five
days later the House Committee on Appropriations directed that the
REAP and Water Bank Programs be reinstated for fiscal 1974. In the
event that Department of Agriculture studies indicated that the same
work could be carried out with less personnel, the committee stated
that it would consider such proposals "with the understanding that no
reductions be made until prior Committee approval has been ob-
tained.' 17 2 An amendment by Representative Robert H. Michel to
limit the scope of the REAP program was later rejected on the House
floor by a vote of 23 to 69.173
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, as en-
acted, contained a modified REAP program entitled "Rural Environ-
mental Conservation Program." The Act directed that the Secretary
of Agriculture "shall carry out the purposes" of specified clauses in
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act and in the Water
Bank Act.'74 The conference report on the agriculture appropriation
bill included funds both for the modified REAP program and for the
Water Bank Act.
175
B. FHA Disaster Loans
The emergency loan program of the Farmers Home Administra-
tion was established to provide a source of loan funds for farmers and
ranchers in areas designated to be disaster areas. In a press release
dated December 27, 1972, the Department of Agriculture announced
that funds were being cut off to counteract inflationary pressures and
169. 119 CONG. Rac. S3811-12 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1973).
170. See H.R. REP. No. 101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
171. 119 CONG. REc. S10,742-44 (daily ed. June 8, 1973).
172. H.R. REP. No. 275, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1973). See id. at 78-80. Con-
curred in by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. RaP. No. 253, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 22-23 (1973).
173. 119 CONG. REc. H4808-10 (daily ed. June 15, 1973).
174. Act of Aug. 10, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 241.
175. H.R. REP. No. 520, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1973).
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to enable adherence to the President's $250 billion spending limit.10
As a result of judicial and legislative efforts, the program was
partially restored. A Minnesota district court decision ordered Secre-
tary Butz to reinstate the program for natural disaster victims in 15
Minnesota counties.
177
Secretary Butz had designated 14 of the counties eligible for
emergency loans on June 26, 1972.178 On September 20, 1972, he
added another county to the list.179 Farmers in those areas were advised
that applications would be accepted and processed through June 30,
1973. They were also advised that it would be preferable to file after
the harvest (late November or early December) to ensure that all
eligible losses were included in the applications. Because of the large
number of applications after the harvest, many farmers were told that
appointments for review could not be made until early 1973. Then,
on December 27, Secretary Butz directed the Minnesota State FHA
office not to accept any applications for the 15 Minnesota counties. 80
The Minnesota court distinguished between two types of secre-
tarial actions: discretionary (declaring which areas were entitled to
disaster assistance) and ministerial (processing applications after a
designation is made). The court held that while an individual does
not have a "right to receive a loan under the disaster loan program,
he does have the right to file an application and to have his applica-
tion reviewed."' 8'1 It was determined by the court that Secretary Butz'
refusal was "in excess of the Secretary's authority and [was] unlaw-
ful."'8 2
Moreover, the court concluded that Secretary Butz had ignored
several departmental regulations, including a requirement to, give
prior notice in the Federal Register for proposed rules, and a require-
ment to provide an opportunity for interested parties to participate
in rulemaking. Also ignored was a requirement to publish an adopted
rule in the Federal Register not less than 30 days before its effective
date. The court noted that the Department "did not comply with even
one of these mandatory requirements .... ,,183
176. H.R. REP. No. 15, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
177. Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
178. See 37 Fed. Reg. 12,854 (1972).
179. Id. at 20,122.
180. Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Minn. 1973).
181. Id. at 151, citing Dubrow v. SBA, 345 F. Supp. 4 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 154. For a similar situation where the Nixon administration tried to
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Congress rewrote the FHA emergency loan program to eliminate
a $5,000 forgiveness feature and to raise the interest rate on loans
from 1 percent to 5 percent.8 4 The new law also eliminates what was
previously discretionary authority for the Secretary of Agriculture.
Instead of "authorizing" him to make loans, the law states that he
"shall" make them.185 And whereas previous law provided that the
Secretary "may" designate any area as an emergency area when he
finds that a need exists, it now provides that he "shall."'8 6 Finally, the
law included an 18-day grace period for eligible applicants in areas
designated by the Secretary of Agriculture after January 1, 1972 and
prior to December 27, 1972.187
C. REA Loan Program
On December 28, 1972, without advance warning and without
prior consultation with the leadership of Congress, the Department
of Agriculture terminated the program of direct loans to rural electric
and telephone borrowers of the Rural Electrification Administration.
Instead of offering federal loans at a fixed 2-percent interest rate, the
Government planned to insure or guarantee private loans at 5 percent.
In his news conference of January 31, 1973, President Nixon re-
sorted to ridicule in an effort to justify the administration's decision:
[What I have found is that when I first voted for REA, 80 percent
of the loans went for the purpose of rural development and getting
electricity to farms. Now 80 percent of this 2 percent money goes for
country clubs and dilettantes, for example, and others who can af-
ford living in the country. I am not for 2 percent money for people
who can afford 5 percent or 7.1s8
S~veral days later, at hearings before the Senate Agriculture and
F6res6y Committee, Secretary Butz was asked whether he agreed with
close down the Office of Economic Opportunity, acting in violation of OEO proce-
dures, see Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60
(D.D.C. 1973).
184. Act of Apr. 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-24, 87 Stat. 24. The first section is
directed against the forgiveness and low-interest features. See S. REP. No. 85, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
185. Act of Apr. 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-24, § 3, 87 Stat. 24. See H. REP. No.
15, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973).
186. Act of Apr. 20, 1973, Pub. Law No. 93-24, § 6, 87 Stat. 25.
187. Id. at § 8.
188. 9 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 107 (1973).
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the President's statement that most REA loans were going to dilet-
tantes and country clubs. Butz replied:
No, not most of them. There are some going like that, of course, in
rural areas. I think the choice of the word "most" was probably un-
fortunate and not premeditated on his part. There are some going
like that, Mr. Chairman, but surely not most of them. 89
Legislation was introduced in each house to reactivate the pro-
gram. The Senate report concluded that the association between REA
and "2-percent money" was an exaggeration. Most loans were a com-
bination of 2-percent REA loans and supplemental assistance from the
Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (CFC), a private
credit cooperative. Fewer than 10 percent of the borrowers were eli-
gible for 2-percent loans. The remainder relied on blended loans, with
about 54 percent eligible for 70 percent REA/30 percent supple-
mental funds, about 20 percent for 80/20 loans, and about 17-18 per-
cent for 90/10 loans. 190
The Senate bill replaced discretionary language with manda-
tory provisions. Instead of providing that the Administrator is "au-
thorized and empowered" to make loans, with discretion as to the
amount, the bill "authorized and directed" loans to be made "in the
full amount determined to be necessary by the Congress or appropri-
ated by the Congress . . . ."191 The House version, which also con-
tained mandatory clauses, proposed a compromise measure designed
to meet some of the objections of the administration. For example,
the House incorporated a new revolving fund for two types of in-
sured loans, one at a "special rate" of 2 percent and the other at a
"standard rate" of 5 percent.192
Secretary Butz pledged to carry out the REA program on the
condition that the mandatory language be stricken from section 305,
which "authorized and directed" the Administrator to make insured
loans. The conference committee complied with his request.1 3 The
enacted statute reflects that change and retains the concept of a re-
volving fund.
94
189. Hearings on Impoundment of Funds for Farm and Rural Programs Before
the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1973).
190. S. REP. No. 20, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1973).
191. Id. at 25-26.
192. H.R. REP. No. 91, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, 19-20, 38 (1973).
193. H.R. REP. No. 169, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 10 (1973).
194. Act of May 11, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-32, 87 Stat. 65.
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When the administration failed to implement the REA program,
Congress threatened to prevent payment of certain salaries and ex-
penses for persons responsible for the delay. The threat was with-
drawn after Congress received assurances from the OMB Director
that he would recommend and support implementation of the pro-
gram.195
D. Rural Water and Sewer Grants
On January 10, 1973, the Department of Agriculture announced
that it was "terminating" planning and development grants in the
water and waste disposal programs of Farmers Home Administra-
tion. The effect was to impound $120 million for fiscal 1973. An
opinion from the General Counsel of the Department justified the
action on the ground that the statute "authorizes but does not re-
quire that the programs be carried out by the Secretary."' 96
The House Committee on Agriculture, in reporting out a bill to
restore the program, said that the grant of discretion by Congress, and
the subsequent abuse of that discretion, made the remedy apparent:
"The Committee has little choice but to act to remove the discre-
tionary features of the original Poage-Aiken Act, and reinstate the
program as originally established by law."'19 The House bill, sub-
stituting the word "shall" for the words "is authorized to" and
"may," passed by a vote of 297 to 54.198 The Senate passed the bill
66 to 22.119
Despite the generous margins of those votes, Congress was unable
to override the President's veto. The House could muster only a vote
of 225 to 189 on the override attempt.200 Nevertheless, the conference
report on the agriculture appropriation bill contained $30 million in
new funds for FHA water and sewer grants, supplemented by $120
million in carryover funds.
20 1
As a general approach to the impoundment of agriculture funds,
195. H.R. REP. No. 520, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1973).
196. H.R. REP. No. 21, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
197. Id. at 3.
198. 119 CONG. REc. H1284-85 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1973).
199. Id. at S5598 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1973).
200. Id. at H2551-52 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973). For veto message, see id. at
H2454 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1973). For fiscal 1974 funding, see H.R. REP. No. 275, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1973). An amendment by Rep. Michel to delete the funds was re-
jected. 119 CONG. REC. H4800-01 (daily ed. June 15, 1973).
201. H.R. REP. No. 520, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973).
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the Senate adopted an amendment to the agriculture appropriation
bill requiring that all money appropriated by the bill "shall be made
available for expenditure except as specifically provided by law. ' '20 2
The exception was intended to cover such statutes as the Antide-
ficiency Act.203 Senator Bayh elaborated on the purpose of this provi-
sion:
This amendment will send the administration a message about
what Congress means when it passes an appropriations bill. It will
tear asunder the administration's argument-which I think specious
in any event-that the amount granted in an appropriations bill is
only the maximum which can be spent on the program in question,
and that the administration has discretion to spend less-down to
nothing if it feels like it.
2 4
The amendment was deleted in conference without prejudice as an
unnecessary restatement of existing provisions of law.20 5
II. ENVIRONMENT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972206 were enacted into law when both houses overrode a presiden-
tial veto, the Senate 52-12 and the House 247-23.207 A month later the
President instructed the head of the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter referred to as "EPA") to withhold from the states more
than half of the waste treatment allotments. Instead of following the
statutory ceilings of $5 billion for fiscal 1978 and $6 billion for fiscal
1974, the President established the maximum allotments for those
years at $2 billion and $3 billion s.2 0
A. Statutory Coverage
The administration had potential spending control in (1) the
initial allotments of contract authority to the states and (2) the obli-
202. 119 CONG. REc. S12,375 (daily ed. June 28, 1973).
203. S. REP. No. 253, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973).
204. 119 CONG. REc. S12,403 (daily ed. June 28, 1973).
205. H.R. REP. No. 520, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973).
206. Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
207. 118 CONG. REc. H10,266-73 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (House override);
id. at S18,546-54 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972) (Senate override).
208. Letter to William Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, from President Richard
M. Nixon, Nov. 22, 1972, in Hearings on the Federal Budget for 1974 Before the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1973),
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gation and expenditure of funds at a later date. The statute appeared
to make the first step mandatory, in the sense that section 205 of the
Act directed that sums "shall" be allotted. However, the original lan-
guage in the House bill had been even stronger, directing that "all"
sums shall be allotted.
20 9
Representative William H. Harsha, ranking Republican on the
conference committee handling the bill, explained that elimination of
the word "all" was intended "to emphasize the President's flexibility
to control the rate of spending."210 Flexibility was enhanced by in-
serting the phrase "not to exceed" in section 207 of the Act, which
described the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
1973, 1974, and 1975. The EPA Administrator could also pace the
expenditure of funds by virtue of his authority to approve plans,
specifications, and estimates.
211
Representative Harsha concluded by saying that he did not see
how "reasonable minds could come to any other conclusion than
that the language [of section 207] means we can obligate or expend
up to that sum-anything up to that sum but not to exceed that
amount." 212 Representative Robert Jones, chairman of the House
conferees, agreed: "there is no doubt in anybody's mind of the intent
of the language. '213 Minority Leader Gerald Ford summed up the
situation:
[T]his clarifies and certainly ought to wipe away any doubts anyone
has. The language is not a mandatory requirement for full obligation
and expenditure up to the authorization figure in each of the 3 fiscal
years. 214
Edmund Muskie, leading Senate sponsor of the bill, remarked
that the President knew "that all the money authorized in the bill
would not have to be obligated.'"215 According to Muskie, the "not to
exceed" language, coupled with the deletion of "all," was to be taken
"to give the administration some flexibility concerning the obligation
209. H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (reported out of House Comm. on
Public Works).
210. 118 CONG. REc. H9122 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
211. Id.
212. Id. at H9123.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at S18,549 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
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of construction grant funds. ' 210 Hence, these speakers were in agree-
ment that the President could exercise some discretion in obligating
and expending funds.
A separate question presented was whether the President also
enjoyed flexibility in allotting the contract authority to the states. In
a decision handed down on May 8, 1973, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the Act required the administra-
tion to allot the full sums authorized to be appropriated by section
207.217 Instead of allotting $5 billion for the first two years, the ad-
ministration should have allotted the full $11 billion. In reaching
that decision, however, Judge Gasch did not try to determine
"whether the Administrator should spend any given amount of
money for sewage treatment works. '2 18 He stated that the question
whether "the entire amount should be obligated is, of couse, not be-
fore this Court.
'219
The question of obligation and spending was at issue in Cam-
paign Clean Water v. Ruckelshaus.220 Judge Merhige found that the
Nixon administration's failure to allot $6 billion in clean-water
money constituted an abuse of discretion.2 21
Unlike Judge Gasch, Judge Merhige warned that excessive with-
holding at the obligation and expenditure stages would contravene
the letter and spirit of the Act. 222 But whereas Judge Gasch decided
that the Act required allotment of all funds, Judge Merhige drew from
the legislative history-particularly the omission of the word "all"
from section 205-a willingness on the part of Congress to allow
some discretion at the allotment stage. However, the degree of im-
poundment-55 percent ($6 billion out of $11 billion for fiscal years
1973 and 1974) -represented "a violation of the spirit, intent and
letter of the Act and a flagrant abuse of executive discretion."2 23
216. Id. at S18,546.
217. City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
218. Id. at 675 (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 679 (emphasis in original). Similar decisions were handed down in
Minnesota v. EPA, Civil No. 4-73 (D. Minn., June 25, 1973); Martin-Trigona v.
Ruckelshaus, Civil No. 72 C 3044 (N.D. Ill., June 29, 1973). In dicta, Judge Hauk
of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California concluded that the
administration did have discretion in allotting funds. Brown v. Ruckelshaus, Civil Nos.
73-154-AAH and 73-736-AAH (D. Cal., Oct. 7, 1973).
220. 361 F. Supp. 689 (D. Va. 1973).





The Merhige decision reconciled two central features of the
clean-water legislation: (1) the grant of discretionary authority to
the executive and (2) the commitment on the part of the Govern-
ment to combat water pollution within a scheduled period of time.
The administration used its discretion to undermine its commitment.
The concept of an overriding legislative commitment is described
most clearly in a decision by Judge Roberts of the Western District
of Texas.2 24 He emphasized Congress's concern with the ability of
state and local governments to effect long-range plans in combating
pollution: "Indeed the planning problem was the reason for the im-
plementation of the allotment procedure rather than the normal ap-
propriation procedure in the Act."225 Without unequivocal federal
financial assistance, state and local governments would have difficulty
entering into long-term contracts and financing long-term bonds. "It
is illogical," wrote Judge Roberts, "to think that Congress would
inject the same uncertainty back into the system it had sought to
avoid with the allotment procedure by giving the Administrator dis-
cretion to choose the amount to be made available to the state and
local governments.
226
Administrative spokesmen claimed that it was impossible to use
the full amount of contract authority provided by Congress. John D.
Ehrlichman, in his capacity as Director of the Domestic Council, said
that there are
only so many contractors who can build sewer plants. There is only
a certain amount of sewer equipment that can be purchased. It be-
comes obvious that there is no point in going out and tacking dollar
bills to the trees. That isn't going to get the water clean.
2 27
Why assume that the environmental industry would be unable
to increase its capacity? It would be more reasonable to expect that
if the Government committed itself financially and established target
dates for the goal of clean water, industry would gear up to meet
that commitment. That is what happened with the 1950's highway pro-
gram, and with the goal set in 1961 of putting a man on the moon by the
224. Texas v. Fri, Civil No. A-73-CA-38 (D. Tex., June 25, 1973).
225. Id. at 2.
226. Id. at 5.
227. Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1973, at A4, col. 5.
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end of the decade. No one argued that those commitments could not
be met because of a lack of contractor capability. The commitment
came first; the capability followed.
After the President's veto, Mr. Ruckelshaus argued that it was
economically unwise to allot the fall amounts authorized by Con-
gress: "the fastest way to increase inflation is to pour more money
into the community than the construction industry can absorb. '22
That conflicts with his own letter to the Office of Management and
Budget, prior to the veto, in which he strongly recommended that the
President sign the bill:
The total value of construction initiated in the near-term under the
enrolled bill is expected to correspond closely to the total value of
construction that would have been initiated under the Administra-
tion bill .... With the projected close correspondence in total near-
term value of construction starts, the potential inflationary impact
upon the entire construction sector would be minimized.
The total amount of contract grant authority contained in the
enrolled bill is formulated from the Administration's estimate of con-
struction needs as submitted to the Congress in February of this year.
The total estimate amounted to $18.1 billion. The Federal share at
75% would amount to $13.6 billion. This needs estimate did not in-
clude any allowance for inflation, nor did it include funds for com-
bined, storm and collection sewers, or for recycled water supplies.
These are project eligibilities newly specified by the enrolled bill.220
In this same letter, Mr. Ruckelshaus pointed out that the needs
estimate provided to Congress was constructed
to support the commitment of the President in his State of the
Union message of January 22, 1970, to "put modern municipal
waste treatment plants in every place in America where they are
needed to make our waters clean again, and to do it now.
This Presidential commitment was repeated in the environmental
messages in 1970 and 1971.230 Mr. Ruckelshaus further noted that the
additional spending authority provided by Congress was "largely the
228. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 417.
229. Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus to OMB, Oct. 11, 1972, in STAFF OF
THE SENATE Cozuze. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., 1 A LEOISLATIVn




result of the Congress adopting a later EPA needs survey than the one
that provided the basis for the Administration's request. ' 231
Notwithstanding the discretion included in the bill, the thrust of
the legislation was to establish a clear commitment and to provide
the necessary budget authority. "To say we can't afford this sum of
money," said Representative Harsha, "is to say we can't afford to
support life on earth. ' 2 2 Senator Muskie stressed that the "whole in-
tent of this bill is to make a national commitment. '233 The discretion-
ary language in the bill was not to be used, Senator Muskie warned,
''as an excuse in not making the commitments necessary to achieve the
goals set forth in the act.
'234
When the administration used that discretion to cut in half a
legislative commitment, the lesson for some legislators was to be less
generous with discretionary authority in the future. It was a tempta-
tion to Congress to be more inflexible when drafting legislation.
Senator Muskie directed these remarks to Mr. Ruckelshaus:
... I could now write better language and believe me, I will. Be-
lieve me, I will.
The clear language and debate was what we were giving you, is
what we understood to be legitimate administrative discretion to,
spend the money, not defeat the purposes. Then to have you twist it
as you have, is a temptation to this Senator to really handcuff you
the next time.
235
III. HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
A. Housing Moratorium
On January 5, 1973, the Nixon administration placed an 18-
month moratorium on subsidized housing programs: low-rent pub-
lic housing, rent supplements, homeownership assistance, and rental
housing assistance. In a speech three days later, HUD Secretary
Romney offered the following justification:
It became crystal clear by 1970 that the patchwork, year-by-
year, piecemeal addition of programs over a period of more than
three decades, had created a statutory and administrative monstros-
231. Id. at 152.
232. 118 CoNG. REC. 1110,268 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972).
233. Id. at S18,547 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
234. Id. at S16,871 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
235. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 411.
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ity that could not possibly yield effective results even with the wisest




That position was repeated a week later by the Director of Do-
mestic Council, Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., who argued that
the program structure we have now cannot possibly yield effective
results even with the most professional management. There is mount-
ing evidence that the present programs, for the most part, have
proven inequitable, wasteful, and ineffective in meeting housing
needs.2sr
Members of Congress pressed the administration for analyses
and studies which justified the moratorium. Senator Proxmire, for
example, wanted to know if the Cole statement was true and "what
documentation he has for it and how you can establish that .... Where
is the evidence?"23 8 It appears that the moratorium was imposed be-
fore such documentation was available. William Lilley, III, HUD's
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development, was "distressed"
to find that "no sophisticated analytical work" had been done prior to
the moratorium. After the subsidized housing program was suspended,
HUD devoted a day and a half to an initial rationalization, which
Lilley called "paper thin, highly subjective and totally unsupported
by any back-up data."
230
Did the housing program "fail to work" because of defects in the
law or because of mismanagement and administrative disinterest?
Dr. Anthony Downs, in a study dated October 1972, described the
homeownership and rental housing programs as "effective instru-
ments for meeting the key objectives of housing subsidies." The basic
designs were considered sound, while the
major inadequacies so far encountered in the execution of these pro-
grams have stemmed mainly from either poor administration by
HUD or the inherently higher risks of investing capital in housing
for relatively low-income households in relatively deteriorated areas.
236. Speech by Secretary Romney, National Association of Home Builders, Houston,
Texas, Jan. 8, 1973, at 7 (on file at the Buffalo Law Review).
237. Letter from Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., to Senator John Sparkman, Jan. 15, 1973,
in 119 CONG. REc. S1723 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1973).
238. Hearings on Oversight on Housing and Urban Development Programs:
Washington, D.C. (Part I) Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1973).
239. Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1973, at Al, col. 5.
IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS
Such higher risks are inescapable in any meaningful attempts to
achieve the basic objectives of housing subsidies.2
40
Regarding public housing leasing and rent supplements, Dr.
Downs said that the programs had "major advantages that indicate
they should be significantly expanded." 241 After identifying and ana-
lyzing the major criticisms of housing subsidies, the Downs study
stated that "the widely expressed conclusion that current housing
subsidy programs 'have failed' or are generally ineffective is false.
' 242
The Joint Economic Committee reported in March 1973 that
most of the scandals and abuses were due to
faulty administration by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment rather than to any inherent defects in the legislation.
Shoddy construction, poor inspection procedures, almost no tenant
counseling, no careful analysis of the cause of high default rates, ex-
cessive land costs, and excessive legal and organizational fees are
examples the Subcommittee found where HUD simply did not do its
job. While some legislative improvements are needed, our present
housing programs are not inherently unworkable as some White
House spokesmen have charged.
243
On June 30, 1973, the Senate adopted an amendment to pro-
hibit the use of any HUD funds unless the Secretary of HUD, during
fiscal 1974, made funds available for obligation contract authority for
rent supplements, homeownership, rental housing assistance and pub-
lic housing.244 The amendment was deleted in conference. 245
In a decision of July 23, 1973, Judge Charles R. Richey of the
U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia called the housing
moratorium unlawful. He ordered Secretary Lynn to accept applica-
tions for subsidies, to process existing and new applications in accord-
ance with HUD regulations, and to approve and complete the proces-
sing of projects found to be qualified under HUD regulations.
246 It
240. A. DOWNS, FEDERAL HOUSING SUBSIDIES: THEIR NATURE AND EFFECTIVE-
NESS, AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT THEM 17 (1972).
241. Id. at 19.
242. Id. at 21.
243. SUBCOMI~rTTEE ON PRIORITIES AND ECONOMsY OF THE JOINT ECONOM~sIC COMu-
MITTEE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., HOUSING SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING POLICY 6 (Comm. Print
1973) (emphasis in original).
244. 119 CONG. REC. S12, 625-27 (daily ed. June 30, 1973).
245. Id. at H6815 [Amendment No. 42] (daily ed. July 28, 1973).
246. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
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was not within the discretion of the Executive "to refuse to execute
laws passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently dis-
agrees." 24
7
The Nixon administration had four years to study housing pro-
grams and to propose remedies. Each budget presentation could have
identified for Congress the inadequacies and what should be done to
correct them. Nothing was proposed except for a consolidation and
simplification bill. To wait four years and then impose a moratorium,
without adequate evidence that the program was structually unsound
or administratively unworkable, was in act of administrative bad faith.
B. Community Development
In a March 1971 appearance before a Senate committee, Secretary
of HUD Romney explained that funds were being held back from
various urban programs in anticipation of the President's revenue
sharing proposal.2 4s He remarked that there was no point in accele-
rating programs that were "scheduled for termination. 2 4 The fact
that Congress had yet to register an opinion about the "termination"
of urban grants was apparently immaterial to Mr. Romney.
Two years later, during Senate hearings on February 1, 1973,
Senator Ervin challenged the right of the administration to use im-
poundment in this manner. He was assured by OMB Director Ash
that the Romney example "dealt not with this year but earlier ac-
tivities. This year the reasons are very compelling ones and different
ones." 25 0
Contrary to the Ash reassurance, impoundment was still very
much a part of the administration's strategy to enact urban revenue
sharing. Secretary Romney, in his speech of January 8, 1973, an-
nounced that "we have ordered a temporary holding action on new
commitments for water and sewer grants, open space grants, and
public facility loans until these activities are folded into the Special
247. Id. at 1372 (footnote omitted). On July 31, 1973, Judge Richey ruled'that
the administration's refusal to further process, improve and implement applications for
Farmers Home Administration interest credit loans was unlawful. Pealo v. Farmers
Home Adm'n, Civ. No. 1028-73 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1870
(D.C. Cir., Aug. 10, 1973).
248. Hearings on Withholding of Funds for Housing and Urban Development
Programs, Fiscal Year 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1971).
249. Id. at 163, 165.
250. 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 278. But see id. at 277.
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Revenue Sharing program." 251 That was underscored a week later
by Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Director of the Domestic Council.
2 52
To impound funds in this prospective sense-holding on to
money in anticipation that Congress will enact an administration pro-
posal-was a new departure for the impoundment technique. Money
was not being withheld to avoid deficiencies, to effect savings, or even
to fight inflation, but rather merely to shift budget priorities from one
administration to the next, all before any congressional action.
In its report of June 19, 1973, the House Committee on Appro-
priations expressed "great concern" that termination of categorical
grant programs for community development
by impoundment of funds or executive fiat is of questionable legality.
Until modified or repealed by the Congress, the Committee directs
that the programs be continued.
253
In that same report, Representative Robert 0. Tiernan pointed out
that the omission of mandatory language in the bill created uncer-
tainty as to the future of community development programs. 254 On
April 6, 1972, the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia had concluded that non-mandatory language in federal housing
legislation made it impossible for the court to order the release of
$150 million in urban renewal funds.255 The court had held that
Congress appeared "to have created much of the executive's discre-
tion to withhold funds and would also appear to be able to limit that
discretion if it so desired.2 56
When the housing appropriation bill reached the floor, Repre-
sentative Tiernan offered an amendment to mandate spending for
three community development programs: Model Cities, urban re-
newal, and open space. His amendment was rejected on a point of
251. Speech by Secretary Romney, National Association of Home Builders, Hous-
ton, Texas, Jan. 8, 1973, at 5 (on file at the Buffalo Law Review).
252. Letter from Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Jan. 15, 1973,
in 119 CONG. REc. S1723 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1973).
253. H.R. REP. No. 296, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973). For 1974 funding of
HUD water and sewer grants, see H.R. REP. No. 275, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1973);
S. REP. No. 253, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1973).
254. H.R. REP. No. 296, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973).
255. Housing Authority v. United States Dep't. of Housing and Urban Dev., 340
F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
256. An earlier decision on housing impoundment ruled that there was no prece-
dent to suggest that a U.S. district court may compel the President "to take any action
whatsoever." San Francisco Redev. Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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order.257 Senator Cranston successfully proposed an amendment to
the housing appropriation bill to prohibit the Secretary of HUD from
using any funds for administrative expenses unless the full amount
appropriated for community development assistance programs was
released during fiscal 1974. That amount included funds to be avail-
able in the fiscal 1974 bill as well as those impounded from prior ap-
propriations.25 The Senate also adopted an amendment that made
air conditioning for the Office of Management and Budget contingent
upon the release of $10.1 million for air conditioning of Veterans
Administration hospitals. 259 As passed by the Senate, the fiscal 1974
appropriation bill contained a general provision to induce the ad-
ministration to spend the funds; the bill specified that all funds
"shall be made available for expenditure except as specifically pro-
vided by law . . .. 260 These amendments to the HUD bill were re-
jected in conference.261
A general directive to spend funds for all federal programs was
included, however, in the continuing appropriations bill passed by the
Senate on June 29, 1973. The provision stated that funds "shall be
made available for expenditure except as specifically provided by
Law."262 The Senate Appropriations Committee intended that
all funds [would] be available for obligation except those for which
a specific reservation ha[d] been provided in this bill or those which
may legally be withheld under the Anti-Deficiency Act or other spe-
cific statutory authority.263
The provision was deleted in conference because it was con-
sidered an unnecessary restatement of existing provisions of law.20 4
The continuing appropriations bill also provided that "[a]ny provi-
sion of law which requires unexpended funds to return to the general
fund of the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year shall not be held to
affect the status of any lawsuit or right of action involving the right
to those funds." 26
5
257. 119 CONG. Rac. H5217-19 (daily ed. June 22, 1973).
258. Id. at S12,624 (daily ed. June 30, 1973).
259. Id. at S12,633.
260. Id. at S12,616. See S. REP. No. 272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
261. 119 CONG. REc. H6814-15 (daily ed. July 28, 1973) (Amendment Nos. 1, 9
& 36).
262. 119 CONG. REG. S12,536 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).
263. S. REP. No. 277, 93d Cong, Ist Sess. 4 (1973).
264. H.R. REP. No. 364, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
265. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. . No. 93-52, § 111, 87 Stat. 134.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Impoundment of funds by the Nixon administration provoked
not only ad hoc efforts to restore specific programs but also more
general remedies. Even members of Congress who at one time were
sympathetic to impoundment now joined the ranks of those insisting
on greater congressional control.
A good example of the change in congressional thinking is
George H. Mahon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions. In 1969 he stated that
the weight of experience and practice bears out the general proposi-
tion that an appropriation does not constitute a mandate to spend
every dollar appropriated .... I believe it is fundamentally desirable
that the Executive have limited powers of impoundment in the in-
terests of good management and constructive economy in public ex-
penditures .... 286
Four years later, no longer confident that the Executive could be
trusted to exercise "limited powers of impoundment," Mahon spon-
sored a bill to prohibit impoundment if both Houses of Congress,
within 60 days, adopted a resolution of disapproval.26 7 To President
Nixon's claim that it was "absolutely clear" that he had the constitu-
tional right to impound funds to prevent an increase in prices or
taxes,268 Mahon insisted that Congress could not concede such broad
authority: "To concede that would mean that we were practically out
of business as a legislative branch. " 269 According to Mahon a failure
to check the administration's use of impoundment "would destroy the
coequal status of Congress .... [and] would be demeaning the Con-
gress." 270
The Mahon impoundment bill, after extensive modification by
the House Committee on Rules, was reintroduced by Representative
Ray J. Madden.2 71 The new House bill provided for disapproval by
266. Letter from Rep. George H. Mahon to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Feb. 25,
1969, in 1971 Ervin Hearings, supra note 14, at 501-02. Mr. Mahon had noted in
1949, in reference to impoundment, that "economy is one thing, and the abandonment
of a policy and program of the Congress another thing." 95 CONG. Ruc. 15,126 (1949).
267. H.R. 5193, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
268. See note 1 supra & accompanying text.
269. Hearings on Impoundment Reporting and Review (Part 1) Before the
House Comm. on Rules, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1973).
270. Id. at 9.
271. H.R. 8480, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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only one House instead of two, reliance on the expertise of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office, a provision to discharge from the Appropria-
tions Committees any impoundment actions referred there, and a
spending ceiling of $267.1 billion for fiscal 1974.272 The bill passed
the House on June 25, 1973.273
The Ervin impoundment bill, which had already passed the
Senate,274 prohibited an impoundment after 60 days unless both
Houses ratified it. Whereas the Madden bill placed upon either the
House or the Senate the burden of disapproving an impoundment
action, the Ervin bill placed upon the administration the burden of
gaining the support of both Houses. Furthermore, the Ervin bill re-
lied to an even greater extent on the GAO for assistance, brought
impoundment actions directly to the floor rather than referring them
first to Appropriations Committees, and established a spending ceiling
of $268.0 billion for fiscal 1974.275
Both Houses moved forward with these bills somewhat reluc-
tantly; they were concerned about the effect of anti-impoundment
legislation on government economy and efficiency. But the extraor-
dinary and unprecedented use of impoundment by the Nixon ad-
ministration left Congress with no other choice. Congress could not
allow the President to justify impoundment on the grounds of fight-
ing inflation and higher taxes. Those policy objectives, attractive
though they may be, do not stand alone. Constitutional government
depends on more than the pursuit of desirable goals. More funda-
mental than goals are the means employed. Who is to set the goals?
What standards and procedures are to be devised to ensure that pub-
lic policy is built upon the law rather than administrative con-
venience?
For all its trappings of conservatism and "strict construction-
ism," the Nixon administration has never demonstrated an under-
standing of what lies at the heart of our political system: a respect for
procedure, a sense of comity and trust between the branches, an ap-
preciation of limits and boundaries. Used with restraint and circum-
spection, impoundment is a viable instrument, capable of being used
without precipitating a crisis. But restraint was replaced by abandon,
272. See H.R. REP. No. 336, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
273. 119 CONG. REc. H6626 (daily ed. June 25, 1973).
274. See notes 30-34 supra & accompanying text.
275. See S. Rep. No. 121, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
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precedent stretched past the breaking-point, and statutory authority
pushed beyond legislative intent. Basic courtesies were neglected, and
OMB's reputation for objectivity and professionalism damaged.
Without good-faith efforts and integrity on the part of executive
officials, the system of delegation, discretion, and nonstatutory con-




A debt limit bill, enacted October 27, 1972, required the Presi-
dent to transmit an impoundment report to Congress.2 76 Although
the language of the law called for "prompt" reporting, the President
still had not complied by January 6, 1973. On that day the Senate
considered an amendment by majority whip Robert C. Byrd to es-
tablish a specific deadline for the information. 277 As finally enacted,
the date was set for February 10.278
The resulting report from the Office of Management and Budget
stated that "budgetary reserves," as of January 29, 1973, amounted to
$8.7 billion.279 Administration spokesmen relied on this report to
announce that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had both impounded
a higher percentage of funds than President Nixon. Secretary Wein-
berger wrote:
Here are the facts: as of Jan. 29 of this year, 3.5 per cent of the
total unified budget was being impounded. That compares with 7.8
per cent on June 30, 1961, under President Kennedy, 6.1 per cent
in 1962, 4 per cent in 1963; 3.5 per cent in 1964 under President
276. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-599, § 402, 86 Stat. 1325.
277. 119 CONG. REc. S275 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1973). See id. at H237 (daily ed.
Jan. 16, 1973); id. at S696 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1973).
278. Act of Jan. 19, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-1, § 2, 87 Stat. 3. A continuing ap-
propriation bill, enacted March 8, 1973, provided for four impoundment reports a
year. The first report shall be transmitted on or before October 15, covering the period
through September 30. The second and third reports shall be submitted on or before
the 15th and 90th days after submission of the budget, and shall cover the periods
through the date of submission and 75 days after that date (i.e., around the end of
January and mid-April). The fourth report shall be submitted on or before July 15
following the end of the fiscal year. Act of Mar. 8, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-9, § 3, 87
Stat. 7.
279. 38 Fed. Reg. 3474 (1973) (reprinted as S. Doc. No. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) ).
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Johnson's first budget, 4.7 per cent in 1965, 6.5 per cent in 1966, 6.7
per cent in 1967, and 5.5 per cent in 1968.280
The "facts" of the matter are a little more complicated. As will
be demonstrated herein, the OMB report omitted approximately $9
billion in impounded funds. Moreover, percentages and dollar
amounts fail to capture the nature and character of impoundment ac-
tions. Not until they are analyzed on a case-by-case basis-separating
the routine from the controversial, the deferred from the cancelled-
is it possible to comprehend the full impact on programs and ac-
tivities.
1. Amounts. Five instances of impoundment were omitted from the
OMB report. The largest of such items was $6 billion in contract
authority withheld from water pollution control programs: $3 billion
each year for fiscal 1973 and fiscal 1974. However, since the President
acted in fiscal 1973 to withhold the amounts for both years, 281 the en-
tire $6 billion should have been included in his report.
The justification for omitting the $6 billion may be found in
the definition of contract authority-budget authority "which per-
mits obligations, but requires an appropriation or receipts 'to liqui-
date' (pay) these obligations." 28 2 Since states could not enter into
obligations until the President allotted the authority, the unallotted
portion ($6 billion) never satisfied the technical definition of either
contract authority or budget authority. By this reasoning, nothing ex-
isted to impound or place in reserve. Caspar W. Weinberger noted
that "the authority to obligate the United States comes into existence
on the date the allotments to the states are made and the amount of
the total obligational authority thus provided is determined by the
total amount allotted. ' 283 Still, it is clear that Congress regarded the
failure to allot the $6 billion as an act of impoundment. Moreover, the
act of October 27, 1972, called for reports on impoundment, not
280. Weinberger, Congress as the Crisis, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 45, col. 5.
281. See notes 208-23 & accompanying text.
282. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 315 (1973).
283. Hearing on Nominations of Caspar W. Weinberger, of California, to be
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Frank C. Carlucci, of Pennsylvania,
to be Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1973).
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"budgetary reserves" or some other category more convenient to the
administration.
The OMB report also failed to include $441 million in contract
authority withheld because of the housing moratorium. 2 4 This amount
included $38,584,000 for rent supplements, $220,983,000 for home-
ownership, $171,473,000 for rental assistance, and $10,209,000 for
college housing. HUD explained that those amounts were not re-
ported because contract authority is not apportioned by HUD and
therefore cannot be placed in "budgetary reserve." 28 5
A third item omitted from the OMB list was $382.8 million in
proposed rescissions (requests to cancel budget authority). This was
comprised of $283.8 million for manpower training services; $17.3
million for the Food and Drug Administration; $4.7 million for
Indian health services; and four programs in the Office of Education:
$18 million for Indian education; $44.3 million for higher education;
$2.9 million for library resources; and $11.9 million for educational
renewal.280 Those amounts were apportioned to their respective agen-
cies, pending congressional action. Since they were actually appor-
tioned, and thus not placed in "budgetary reserve," they were omitted
from the OMB list.287
Whether apportioned or not, the proposed rescissions were func-
tionally identical to impoundment. The agencies were instructed not
to obligate the funds until Congress acted. Even if Congress rejected
the proposed rescissions there was no guarantee that the money would
be used. Weinberger explained:
Our determination of what steps to take if the funds are not rescinded
will be dependent upon a number of factors which are currently un-
known, such as the status of Congressional action on other fiscal year
1973 appropriations and where we stand with respect to our firm
target of maintaining outlays below $250 billion in fiscal year 1973.288
Part of the proposed rescissions were released as a result of court
action. Of the $44.3 million withheld from higher education, $25
million was for veterans' cost-of-education grants to colleges and uni-
284. See notes 236-47 supra & accompanying text.
285. Statistics and argument obtained from HUD budget office.
286. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, APPENDIX 1074 (1973).
287. 38 Fed. Reg. 3474 (1973).
288. Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger to Senator Jacob K. Javits, Feb. 22,
1973, in 1973 Ervin Hearings, supra note 12, at 732.
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versities. Judge Gesell of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ordered the Office of Education to issue regulations so that
colleges and universities could apply for grant assistance.289 The Office
later agreed to fund the program in its entirety.
290
The $18 million for Indian education was also released because
of pressure from litigation.29 1 When the fiscal 1974 budget proposed
to rescind $10 million for land-grant colleges (the Bankhead-Jones
Act) ,292 the National Association of State Universities and Land
Grant Colleges brought suit against HEW Secretary Weinberger in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.2 3 The Depart-
ment of Justice informed the court that, in view of Congress's failure
to approve the rescission requests, HEW was now implementing the
program. The case was dismissed as moot.
29 4
In rejecting the rescission requests, 295 both houses were
highly critical of the Department's actions with respect to items pro-
posed for rescission. Little was done in the way of anticipating Con-
gressional action on these items. As a result, those who wish to apply
for funding are required to do so on extremely short notice. The
conferees are aware that to date the Department has acted with less
than alacrity, and expects that all possible considerations be given to
applicants. 29
A fourth category omitted by OMB was $1.9 billion withheld
from the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare.
289. National Ass'n of Collegiate Veterans v. Ottina, Civ. No. 349-73 (D.D.C.,
May 24, 1973). See Washington Post, Mar. 28, 1973, at A2, col. 7.
290. Washington Evening Star and Daily News, May 23, 1973, at B4, col. 1;
Washington Post, May 23, 1973, at A7, col. 1.
291. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, Civ. No. 628-73 (D.D.C., May 8,
1973). See Education Daily, May 10, 1973, at 2; id., Apr. 30, 1973, at 4; N.Y. Times,
June 25, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
292. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, APPENDIX 1074 (1973).
293. National Assoc. of State Univ. & Land Grant Colleges v. Weinberger, Civ.
No. 1014-73 (D.D.C., dismissed June 29, 1973).
294. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Impoundment Cases, at 5, Aug. 10, 1973 (memo-
randum).
295. H.R. REP. No. 164, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1973); S. REP. No. 160, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973).
296. H.R. REP. No. 295, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973). The veto of this supple-
mental appropriation bill by President Nixon on June 27, 1973, does not alter the fact
that his requests for rescission were rejected by the Appropriations Committees of both
houses. As enacted, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1973, extended by
three months the availability of certain higher education funds affected by the rescis-
sion requests. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, 87 Stat. 106-07.
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The appropriation bill for those departments had been vetoed once
by the President and pocket-vetoed a second time.297 During this pe-
riod the Labor-HEW programs were financed by means of a continu-
ing resolution, under which departments and agencies were generally
funded at the level approved by the House or the Senate, whichever
was lower. Instead, the administration decided to fund the programs
at an even lower level-the President's revised 1973 budget requests.
29 8
The difference of $1.9 billion was not technically "budgetary re-
serves," since the apportionment process was waived for continuing
appropriations. 29  Yet the effect was identical to impoundment.
Because of the administration's action in withholding Labor-
HEW funds, House Appropriations prepared a continuing appropria-
tions bill to establish spending authority for the Departments of La-
bor and Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies "as now
or hereafter passed by the House and Senate." The "current rate" for
projects and activities in the Labor-HEW bill was defined to be those
established by Congress in the continuing resolution for fiscal 1973-
a level higher than the actual ongoing administrative rate.
300
The fifth, and final, item omitted from the OMB impoundment
report was approximately $300 million withheld from the FHA dis-
aster loan program. That is the estimated saving that would have
been realized had the program been cancelled. 30 1 Adding the five
omissions to the OMB list of $8.7 billion brings the impoundment
total up to $17.7 billion. Instead of only 3.5 percent of the Nixon
budget being impounded, the actual percent was at least twice that
amount.
2. Program Impact. Although it is not very helpful to compare ad-
ministrations with aggregate figures, either by dollar amounts im-
pounded or by percentages, such comparisons are instructive in show-
ing the impact of impoundment within an administration.
The OMB report listed $1.899 billion withheld from the Depart-
297. 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1240, 1578 (1973).
298. 119 CONG. REc. H4694-95 (daily ed. June 13, 1973) (statement by Rep.
Bell); id. at S3351 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1973) (statement by Sen. Cotton).
299. See e.g., Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-344, § 103, 86 Stat. 404.
300. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 101(a) (4), 87 Stat. 131. See 119
CONG. REC. H5358-59, S12,537-38 (daily ed. June 26, 1973). See H.R. REP. No. 328,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973); S. REP. No. 277, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
301. Obtained from the Agriculture budget office. Some of this will be spent be-
cause of court and congressional actions taken after the OMB impoundment report. For
details on the FHA disaster loan program, see notes 176-87 supra & accompanying text.
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ment of Defense (military functions), $1.497 billion from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and $529 million from HUD. As percentages of
total available budget authority for fiscal 1973 that translates to 2.4
percent for Defense, 13.0 percent for Agriculture, and 10.5 percent for
HUD.30 2 As Defense is underrepresented, the main burden of im-
poundment obviously falls on the domestic sector.
Those percentages actually understate the full extent of that bur-
den. Two other calculations are needed. The first involves the OMB
report's omission of $300 million in FHA disaster loan funds and $441
million in HUD contract authority.303 Thus, a more accurate com-
parison would be: 2.4 percent for Defense, 15.6 percent for Agricul-
ture, and 19.2 percent for HUD.
A second focuses on the amount of unobligated funds which
lapse at the end of the fiscal year. Deferral of spending is less serious
to an agency than outright loss of funds. Of the Defense impound-
ments, all unobligated funds will be available beyond fiscal 1973 ex-
cept for $7.5 million in annual accounts; $5.1 million in Reserve Per-
sonnel, Marine Corps, and $2.4 million in the Special Foreign Cur-
rency Program.304 Thus, less than one-half of 1.0 percent of Defense
impoundments was scheduled to lapse.
That stands in stark contrast with the $207 million of Agriculture
money not available beyond fiscal 1973.305 Moreover, there are addi-
tional funds which are technically or legally "available" after fiscal
1973, of which the administration had no intention of spending: $300
million for the FHA disaster loan program, $210 million for REAP,
$11 million for the Water Bank Program, $456 million for REA loans,
and $120 million for rural water and waste disposal grants. In a practi-
cal sense, then, 72.6 percent of Agriculture impoundments would have
been lost after fiscal 1973 without legal and legislative efforts to re-
strain the administration. 300
All of the $970 million withheld from HUD was technically avail-
302. Based on the following fiscal 1973 estimates for budget authority: Agricul-
ture, $11.532 billion; Defense-Military, $77.804 billion; and HUD, $5.048 billion.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 329 (1973).
303. Information obtained from Agriculture and HUD budget offices.
304. The OMB report, supra note 279, included a column "Available beyond fiscal
year 1973?"
305. Id.
306. For details on these agriculture impoundments, see notes 164-205 supra &
accompanying text.
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able after fiscal 1973. But with the single exception of $6.6 million in
housing production and mortgage credit, the administration had no
plans to spend the money.307 In the area of Defense, none of the funds
that extended beyond fiscal 1973 faced political impoundment.
Thus, a comparison of the three Departments in terms of the
percent of impoundments that would lapse-either legally or politic-
ally-reveals: 0.4 percent, Defense; 72.6 percent, Agriculture; and
99.3 percent, HUD.
B. The 11-Billion Saving
During the fall election months of 1972, when President Nixon
asked Congress for a $250 billion ceiling for fiscal 1973, administra-
tion spokesmen argued that congressional action threatened to drive
federal spending to an irresponsible and inflationary level. The Presi-
dent declared his intention to "fight every attempt by the Congress to
bust that budget, because a big spending spree by the Congress will
have only one result, a hangover of higher taxes or higher prices for
every working family in America."308 After Congress refused to grant
him a spending ceiling, the President announced his determination to
"use every weapon at my command to hold spending in this fiscal
year as close as possible to $250 billion ....
In an article for The New York Times, Secretary Weinberger
claimed that "only Presidential intervention" prevented an additional
$1 1-billion increase in the fiscal 1973 budget. Weinberger maintained
that the President ordered the "most exhaustive evaluation of Fed-
eral programs ever undertaken" in order to ferret out waste and in-
efficiency.310 The alleged saving came from two sources: $6.5 billion
in program reductions and terminations, and $4.7 billion attributed
to the following items (in billions) :311
307. Information obtained from HUD budget office. Some of this budget au-
thority could be made available for the Administration's special revenue sharing pro-
posal or for the suspended housing programs, but that will require legislative action.
308. 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1497 (1972).
309. Id. at 1553.
310. Weinberger, Congress as the Crisis, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1973, at 45,'
col. 5.
311. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED.
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1973, at 49 (1972).
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Additional stockpile disposals -0.4
Additional non-federal financing for federal credit
programs -1.1
Deferral of various payments:
General revenue sharing -1.5
Other -0.5
Additional offshore oil receipts -1.0
Increase in user charges and other actions -0.2
Starting with this list of $4.7 billion, most of the action consists
of bookkeeping processes and deferrals rather than actual savings. To
sell $1.5 billion in stockpile assets and federal credit is not a saving
in the sense that a program is eliminated or reduced. Nor is it a sav-
ing to push certain costs into the early months of the next fiscal year,
such as the $2.0 billion in general revenue sharing and other defer-
rals. Furthermore, the $1.0 billion in offshore oil receipts is more
properly considered as additional revenue rather than "outlay
savings."
Turning now to the $6.5 billion, a significant percentage of the
program reductions and terminations resulted from factors over which
the administration had no control. For example, $2.343 billion repre-
sented monies which might have been spent had Congress not estab-
lished a ceiling of $2.5 billion for the social services grant program.
12
To designate that as part of the President's $11 billion savings is a
strange use of statistics.
Several other large savings resulted from congressional action or
inaction. Highway spending was reduced by $100 million because Con-
gress failed to pass the Highway Act of 1972.313 Similarly, the defeat
of the appropriation bill for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
resulted in an outlay saving of $10 million.314 Also significant was
legislation enhancing the marketability of bonds for the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, permitting earlier use of bond
312. Id. at 49, 53.
313. Much of the information in footnotes 314-24 can be found in id. at 50-57,
but a more detailed examination by OMB was forwarded to the Joint Economic Com-
mittee and reprinted in Hearings on The 1973 Economic Report of the President (Part
1) Before the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 124-86 (1973) [herein-
after referred to as 1973 Economic Report]. For information on Highway Act of 1972,
,see 1973 Economic Report at 171.
314. 1973 Economic Report at 184.
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revenues and $80 million in outlay savings. 315 Still another factor ex-
ternal to administrative action was the termination of the European
Monetary Agreement by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, producing an outlay saving of $242 million.316 , i
Projects were delayed in some cases because of environmental
considerations, especially projects that had been authorized prior to
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Those delays affected
projects by the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation,
airport grants, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, AEC's
Plowshare program, and TVA construction activity-a total of $155
million related to environmental factors.3 17 The motivating force here
was not administrative initiative but compliance with legislative
standards.
Other large savings resulted from normal administrative responsi-
bilities: eliminating unnecessary advance payments in the Medicare
program, and eliminating overpayments or payments to ineligible re-
cipients in the Medicaid and public assistance programs. Those items
amounted to $572 million. 31 Surely it cannot be argued that the Con-
gress would want the administration to pay for unnecessary advance-
ments, overpayments, or ineligible recipients.
Nor could Congress have expected the administration to spend
funds for FAA equipment subject to procurement delays;3 19 for Urban
Mass Transportation research and development experiencing problems
with new technology;320 for intermodal research and development in
the Transportation Department affected by administrative delays;
321
for termination payments on the supersonic transport delayed by ne-
gotiations to settle claims;322 or for maritime subsidies delayed by late
shipments of grain.32 Outlay savings for those items came to $90
million.
In short, more than half of the $6.5 billion in reductions and
terminations can be accounted for by the following four categories:
315. Id. at 186.
316. Id. at 130.
317. Id. at 144-45, 165, 172, 175-76, 186.
318. Id. at 145, 157.
319. Id. at 172.
320. Id. at 173.
321. Id. at 173-74.
322. Id. at 174-75.
323. Id. at 141-42.
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$2.775 billion related to congressional action or inaction; $155 million
related to environmental factors; $572 million in normal administra-
tive responsibilities; and $90 million produced by administrative de-
lays or late shipments-a total of $3.592 billion.
324
324. For other critiques of the "$1l-billion saving," see 119 CoNo. REc. S7863-65
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1973) (statement by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the
United States); id. at S7391-94 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1973) (staff study of Joint Eco-
nomic Committee).
